In the case of the Gawker data breach, would strong passwords be ok?

Question

In the Gawker data breach, was just the database stolen and that gave free access to all user data? Or did the hackers still need to read the MD5's of the usernames and passwords to gain access to the data?

If you had a strong, non-dictionary, 12+ character password, is there any need to worry?

Answer 1

The strength of a password is related to two things:

• Entropy -- Relative strength as measured in bits.
• Iteration speed -- How long it would take to exhaustively test against a certain function.

Gawker used DES crypt hash method (not the best choice). That seems to be roughly 10 times slower to brute force than MD5. A GeForce 8800 Ultra (2007 vintage) is widely cited as tackling 200 million MD5 hashes per second. My GeForce 560 TI is about four times as fast. 200*4/10 = 80 million DES crypt hashes per second.

A password of 26+26+10+10 (lower, upper, numbers, 10 symbols) and 12 characters long is worth 2⁷⁴ bits of entropy. DES maxes out at 2⁵⁶. Wolfram Alpha tells me you've got a little bit of wiggle room against one graphics card at 2⁵⁶ bits of entropy.

Alternately, there's the DES cracker perspective where the entire keyspace could be tested in about 10 days in 1998 by an EFF pet project. Thus, your relatively strong password might still be defeated by the limitations of a smaller hashing space and a quickly attacked algorithm.

I wouldn't hold my breath, but at least you won't end up on a top passwords list.

Answer 2

No, it is not OK. Gawker used DES encryption instead of a strong hashing method. DES is weak enough to brute-force on modern hardware.