All serious full disk encryption schemes I have looked into use a static password for authentication. For example, TrueCrypt supports two-factor authentication with keyfiles, but not for system partitions. It's possible to use a Yubikey in static mode as a second factor with TrueCrypt full disk mode. But in both cases the second factor is really just a part of the static password that the user chooses to not memorize.
Clearly full-disk encryption requires authenticating users before the OS boots, so interactive challenge-response protocols involving a remote host won't work. But I don't see any insurmountable obstacles to implementing a secure, pre-boot one-time password mechanism.
Why is support for strong multi-factor authentication not more common in full disk schemes? Are there any viable implementations? Are static passwords considered good enough because an adversary capable of defeating them in a pre-boot context is probably also capable of recovering the encryption key (not authentication key) after any form of authentication, regardless of how many factors?