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Two-factor authentication, password + device, seems to be increasingly mainstream among consumers with products like Activision Blizzard's Battle.NET authenticators. However, I am curious what the difference in level-of-security between a stand-alone key fob and mobile phone.

Given the connectivity of a mobile phone, it seems vastly more vulnerable than a device with a button and display which would need to be disassembled to gain access (but even with direct hardware access, is the key protected?) Given that both add some additional security and the pool of people who opt not to use it is still large (if not the majority), this is probably a non-issue in the Battle.NET case, but generally, how do they compare?

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@CodeInChaos thanks, I don't quite know the proper lingo – Nick T May 22 '12 at 21:19

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Relative to the idea of multi-factor authentication, any additional factor beyond something you know adds an additional level of complexity for someone to gain unauthorized access to an account. The second factor that many organizations use is something you have be it a fob of sorts (event or time based OTP), smartcard (HSM), phone (SMS, call), or an application (in the case of "soft" tokens (either an app that's installed on the phone or computer)).

Key fobs have become popularized but the security industry has seen that exploitation is possible (do a search on RSA and you'll see why). Key fobs can be broken if someone breaks the system. Instead of disassembling each token out there, an attacker broke into RSA and gained access (though I don't recall if this was "proven" or not) to the secret sauce that makes each token unique. Similarly, smartcards and USB tokens can be broken if the adversary successfully attacks a higher level in the tech stack or process to ensure each smartcard is unique. Mobile authenticators can be broken (same way as with RSA or via other means), but the idea hasn't ever been to block 100% of the attacks, which is cost prohibitive for most organizations. The goal is to implement preventative (where possible) and detective technologies such that unauthorized access attempts are blocked or identified where successful. To that end, mobile and hardware fobs still add value.

Perhaps to your point, mobile authenticators likely provide sufficient protection for Battle.NET users. Fundamentally, they're protecting against users stealing money or gaining access to someone else's account. In the event someone is really interested in breaking the system, hardware or mobile authenticators (or even biometric) layered in third and fourth factors may not be sufficient. So from a cost perspective, mobile authenticators are cheaper to deploy, simpler for users to use, and provide an additional layer of protection. Hardware authenticators are more costly for both the user and game provider to implement and maintain.

To sum it up, mobile is good enough for the use case.

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It's a trade-off, both have different advantages and weaknesses. IMO mobile authenticators are much stronger than classic tokens in practice, if built correctly.

Their great advantage is that they can display what you're authorizing in a place a trojan on your PC does not have access to.

For example with online banking it might display the amount transfered and the target account number.

For gaming it can distinguish simple logins for playing, and high risk operations like changing password, email or disabling the authenticator.

Their weakness is that it's easier to compromize a smartphone than it is to compromize a simple token.

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Given the connectivity of a mobile phone, it seems vastly more vulnerable than a device with a button and display which would need to be disassembled to gain access (but even with direct hardware access, is the key protected?) Given that both add some additional security and the pool of people who opt not to use it is still large (if not the majority), this is probably a non-issue in the Battle.NET case, but generally, how do they compare?

Your question really is: "Is a desktop application that generates a security token as secure as a physical device that does the same"

The answer to this question is: it depends

Recently it was discovered that the RSA Windows application that generates a security token has security flaw because of not only how it works but because it uses a security feature built into Windows to protect the token data. In order to keep this statement short, it was discovered that the token can be copied, which allows future tokens to be generated.

This flaw also exists in some versions of mobile authenticators. For instance It is possible to "duplicate" the Blizzard Mobile Authenticator and write a desktop application if you root/jailbreak your Android/IPhone and copy the serial and secret token. This is because the file that contains this information at least on Android is not protected that well ( shift operation ). In the case of a jailbroken IPhone basic security features in the operating system can be disabled, which normally cannot be disabled, in order to do something similar.

In the end an application on a closed system like a mobile phone is a great deal more secure then a traditional desktop application.

I consider Android, Windows Phone 7.x, and iPhone to be closed systems

Some of the problems with the RSA Windows desktop application likely stims from their earlier compromised based on how the algorithm works

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It seems here you're addressing desktop vs. smartphone implementations. While this information is useful, it is not the comparison that Nick seems to be looking for. He wants to know the security level difference between desktop- or smartphone-based authenticators and token-based authenticators. i.e.: RSA SecurID token vs. SMS message. – Iszi May 23 '12 at 16:33
@IsziRoryorIsznti - I admit I did group the traditional desktop application and mobile application into one group ( mainly in his specfic example dealing with Blizzard's authenticator it applies ) as the physical device generates a 6-digit code instead of 8-digit code. He wanted to compare an application to the physical device. So your conclusion that he wants to compare the RSA SecureID to SMS messages is incorrect. – Ramhound May 23 '12 at 16:55

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