Because HTTPS is not very well suited to securing downloads of large public files. For this use case, it's slow and not that useful. There are reasons for not using HTTPS well beyond incompetence or unawareness.
HTTPS requires more resources on the server. Google mail got it down to a 1% overhead and a 2% bandwidth overhead, but this is for a very different use case. The Gmail frontend servers do more than mindlessly serve files; a file server doesn't need a powerful CPU in the first place (it's very strongly IO-bound), so the overhead is likely to be significantly larger. The same goes for memory overhead: a file server needs very little memory per session in the first place, almost all of its memory is a disk cache. Getting the resource usage down requires a serious amount of work.
HTTPS uses more bandwidth. The overhead per download is minimal if you don't take caching into account. This is the spherical cow of “HTTPS doesn't cost more”: if you use SSL, you can't cache data. Application downloads are cachable in the extreme: they're large files that many people download.
HTTPS is overkill. The confidentiality of an application download is rarely an issue, all we need is authenticity. Sadly, HTTPS doesn't provide authenticity without also providing confidentiality. Authenticity is compatible with caching, but confidentiality isn't.
HTTPS wouldn't help many people. The security-conscious will check the SHA1 provided by the vendor (that should be over HTTPS). The non-security-conscious will blithely click through the “this connection is insecure” message (there are so many badly configured servers out there that many users are trained to ignore HTTPS errors). And that's not to mention dodgy CAs who grant certificates that they shouldn't.
HTTPS doesn't even fully solve the problem. If you're getting your application straight from the vendor's website, HTTPS does ensure the authenticity of the application. But if you're getting your application from a third party (e.g. mirrors of free software), HTTPS only protects the connection with the third party. A package signature scheme works better: it can protect the whole chain from the vendor.
If you want to make sure that you're getting the genuine application, check its signature, or check its hash against a reference value that you obtain with a signature (for example over HTTPS).
Good vendors make this automatic. For example, Ubuntu provides GPG signatures of its installation media. It also provides the hashes over HTTPS (sadly not linked from anywhere near the download page as far as I can see). After that, the software installation tool automatically checks that packages come with a valid signature. See How to use https with apt-get?
The data can't be read by a middle-man while in transitdoes not apply in application download scenario. If I know you're visiting mozilla's website and you're downloading a large amount of data, it is almost certain without even looking at your data stream that you must be downloading the latest version of Firefox, and I can just go to Mozilla instead of having to decrypt your data stream. So serving application downloads over HTTPS only really protects against MITM. – Lie Ryan Aug 19 '12 at 12:28https://repository.example.com/, hosting packages for a distribution; now what am I downloading? – Piskvor Aug 21 '12 at 9:31