One of the features support by modern processes and Trusted Platform Modules is "dynamic chain of trust" (also known under the acronym DRTM, for dynaimc root of trust measurement). This allows loading a critical piece of software in an isolated execution environment, where it can be protected from the rest of the software on the system.
The feature is initiated via the SENTER instruction (on Intel chips) or SKINIT instruction (on AMD). On Intel, this is part of Intel's Trusted Execution Technology (TXT). I've sometimes heard this technology under the name "late launch": e.g., if you want to start a hypervisor or other critical software while the system is already running, in a trusted way, you do a "late launch" of the hypervisor/software module.
DRTM/"late launch" provides isolation (so that other software components cannot tamper with the code or data of the trusted module that is launched in this way). It also provides sealed storage, so that the trusted module can store data in encrypted form, where the decryption key will be released to future invocations of the trusted module but not to any other software component.
Does "dynamic chain of trust" support remote attestation? Does it provide way to attest to the code of the trusted module that was launched in this way, to a third party?