This question is on the assumption that any data once encrypted, may (eventually) be decrypted through
- Brute force (compute power/time)
- Exploits in the cryptography used
- Theft of private keys
Most threat models, procedures, and business interaction I've been involved with has focused on the protection and security of current or future data, but not so much on what's needed to maintain the safety of data previously encrypted.
"Previously encrypted data" may not only include encrypted messages or files, but also may include an capture of a previous SSH or VPN session.
Is there any discussion in the IT Security community about data that was encrypted on a given date in relation to Moore's law, Cloud computing, and time all working as factors that might decrypt previously encrypted information?
Is there discussion on the theft of a private key that would put prior data at risk?
Many people in the business and legal departments consider encryption an infallible lockbox that can never break, and don't see it as an encrypted blob whose security decays over time, and needs ongoing vigilance to maintain. (e.g. don't be careless with these blobs, don't leave them on a public server for analysis as people may attempt to decrypt it)
I'm interested in any thought around
- If this is a factor in deciding to use a private hardwire connection instead of a VPN
- Examples and methods to gauge the time sensitivity of information, and exposure risk
- Risks and remediations within the IT Security realm
- Ways to communicate the risk (and relevant remediation) to non-technical folk. (e.g. for funding)
- ... ?