"Not considering brute force" - that's exactly what these tools measure.
Obviously they dont try social engineering, or trying to discover if it's the user's first girlfriend's dog's birthday. The attacker might know that, but these tools don't.
What they do measure is simply the difficulty for a bruteforcing tool to crack it. Not even the entropy of the password, which is an attribute of the generation method, just an estimate of how long it would take a bruteforcing tool to successfully find the correct password.
Obviously, entropy has an effect on this, but it is only total entropy that matters, not entropy-per-character. So yes, having a lot of equi-probable options for each character does add to the entropy, but length can play an even more important part in making a password uncrackable, by raising the entropy-per-character to a higher power, by character count. This makes for a much higher total entropy, which is the only thing that matters.
So, in your case - yes, the 32-character, alpha-only passphrase is much stronger than the 8-character punctuation password.
I'm gonna try and do the maths here for a bit: (please correct me when I'm wrong):
If we assume standard US-style keyboard, there are 85 possible printable characters (possibly be able to scrape a few more, but lets go with this for now): lowercase letters + upper case letters + numerals + standard punctuation + space.
This grants ~6.3 bits strength per character; at 8 chars length the password gives you ~50.4 bits strength.
Note really very strong... Even if we throw in a few more "special" characters, you're not going to upgrade that very much.
Now, for your 32 character, alpha-only passphrase...
Let's assume lowercase and uppercase letters only (even though you didnt use any), plus a space (U+32). Not even numerals...
That gives you 54 possible characters, around ~5.8 bits per character. At 32 chars long, thats over 185 bits strength. Substantially stronger. And that's even without numerals, which are usually accepted even in "simple" password schemes.
Bruce Schneier often talks about how switching to long memorable passphrases would be much more secure than short, randomized weird-looking passwords.
Now you see why.