There is no known issue with reusing the salt used in PBKDF2 for the IV of CBC encryption, and it would be mildly surprising if it did have an impact because the salt enters as input to hash functions, and the output is used as key for the block cipher. Thus, there are "two layers" between the salt and the IV. However, surprises do happen sometimes. Reuse of any data element for two roles is, as a basic rule, potentially dangerous.
Since PBKDF2 is a Key Derivation Function which can produce an output of arbitrary length, it seems safer to simply make it generate the key and the IV. That's what is usually done in these matters.
Alternatively, if the key obtained from the password and salt will be used for only one file ever, then you could use a fixed, conventional IV (trouble with IV in CBC begins at the second usage of the key, so it tolerates an all-zero IV if and only if the key is used only once). It would still be better to replace CBC with an Authenticated Encryption mode like EAX or GCM, which has fewer constraints on IV (with EAX or GCM, it is "obvious" that a conventional IV is not a problem, as long as the key is used once) and will give you integrity on top of confidentiality.