While I am sure there are, in fact, firewalls that may do that, I am not off-hand aware of any that operate this way. There are packet spoofing detection mechanisms, although they tend to act a little different.
A bogon is defined as bogus IP address. Specifically, it is the list of all IP addresses that have not been allocated by IANA, by a delegated RIR. The best way to get this list is for your firewall to support subscribing to a bogon service. If you enable bogon filtering on your firewall it also tends to also include ingress packets where the source address is listed as an RFC 1918 address.
It is also customary to block using the same rule, or locally edit your bogon list, to include your local allocation. It is generally considered unlikely that your internal IP addresses will be seen on the ingress port of your firewall. An exception to this would be any equipment of yours that exists outside your firewall. This would most likely include packet shapers, routers, or other infrastructure equipment, but in some cases other equipment may purposely be left external. Make sure to exclude those from the bogon list.
For devices like border firewalls we generally have a really good idea what physical devices are able to directly communicate with them. This should, again, be infrastructure devices like packet shapers, routers, etc. If you have a DMZ then you may also see those devices in there depending on your architecture. In this case we can enumerate the MAC addresses that should be able to talk directly to the firewall and deny any that aren't on that list. Incidentally, this also helps catch systems that end up on this network segment that shouldn't.
For firewalls that may be deployed for departments, or in a transparent/bridge mode within a network for segmenting a subset of hosts, building these lists can be a lot harder.
Between two hosts the number of hops generally remains constant, or changes very little, between packets. As such if the TTL dramatically changes from one packet to another this could easily be a spoof attempt. This does require keeping more state information, and is not fool-proof since the route could change, but is often indicative enough.
If you have multiple active uplinks then you can also verify that the packet is coming in on the correct interface. There exists a standard for this called Reverse Path Forwarding (RPF). In short every time a packet is received on an interface the router checks its routing tables and determines if that is the correct interface for that source address. That is, if the routing tables say that packets destined for 188.8.131.52/24 are transmitted over interface ge-0/0/18 and it receives a packet from 184.108.40.206 on interface ge-0/0/20 then it is probably spoofed and should be dropped.