The first problem I can see is how do you find the first certificate? If you've visited the site before, then I suppose you could, but for anyone that doesn't keep certificates around from all the sites they have visited, we'd need some infrastructure to be able to look up all certificates that resolve for a particular CN.
Additionally, such a system might add another point of failure as such a service could be attacked (or the revocation list itself could be attacked) resulting in a failure to be able to authenticate a certificate.
I'm also not sure that it is a huge security threat. As I understand it, the revocation list is around primarily to prevent a leaked certificate from being used on a rogue site, not to prevent a rogue certificate from being used anywhere. And in fact, with such a system, it might be possible for the rogue certificate to knock out the trust of the original real certificate which could be even more damaging.
Yes, the problem of rogue registrars is a hard problem to solve and if you have a local store of the cert on file, then it is may be worth displaying a warning if it is replaced before expiration, but I'm not sure that we want revocation being used for more than loss of control of the private key or invalid initial issuance (which really is another form of loss of control of the private key).