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Mosh has been around for a while now. Although it's claimed to be "a replacement for SSH" by its authors, mosh does actually depend on ssh to do the initial authentication, after which an instance of the mosh binary is started on the server, the established SSH connection over TCP is abandoned (after serving its purpose for the authentication and the bootstrapping), and all shell communication and the network roaming henceforth happens through a mosh protocol over UDP, still with some kind of encryption, but completely separate from ssh.

This all sounds quite simple and elegant, however, devil is always in the details.

What do the security specialists think of mosh now that it's been around for a couple of years?

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From their own FAQ:

Q: Has your secure datagram protocol been audited by experts?

A: No. Mosh is actively used and has been read over by security-minded crypto nerds who think its design is reasonable, but any novel datagram protocol is going to have to prove itself, and SSP is no exception. We use the reference implementations of AES-128 and OCB, and we welcome your eyes on the code. We think the radical simplicity of the design is an advantage, but of course others have thought that and have been wrong.

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