I think there is a bit of confusion here between two different applications Full Disk Encryption (i.e. Truecrypt) and password generation and storage schemes (i.e. KeePass). These two situations have very different goals and security models.
The first application Full Disk Encryption uses a layered key approach to allow easy key change, minimization of data encrypted under low entropy keys and (in some cases at least) multiple methods of data recovery.
If you have a random high entropy key used for data encryption you are giving many P/C pairs to the attacker but the key is also strong. The lower entropy key is then used only for a few P/C pairs (maybe 2-10 blocks or so). This isn't probably a huge issue these days since we believe that finding even one bit of a key or its parity is as hard as finding all of them but it still feels better to give the attacker a smaller attack surface for the worse key.
At the same time for many FDE uses you might want to have multiple people with different passwords/keys be able to access the data or have a different access method for an administrator then a user. Since the underlying encryption must be the same you use some other key to encrypt it with.
For the second application the attack model is a lot different. Whereas for Truecrypt like applications you are assuming someone has access to all the data and headers at the same time (they stole your hard disk), in the case of KeePass you usually assume that the place where the encrypted keys (your KeePass container) are stored is different then the places where the keys are used (the websites/servers/credit cards/what not). This means you generally assume that it is significantly harder or costlier for the attacker to attack the the encrypted keys (your KeePass container) then to launch an attack against the place where the keys are used.
Think of it this way: if your password to your KeePass container is "Princess" and all the keys in it are random generated before the attacker can start writing emails as you he first has to obtain the KeePass container from our hard disk and figure out that "Princess" is your password, since attacking the randomly generated key you use to log in to the email account is unfeasible.
if on the other hand the password to your email account is "Princess" all the attacker has to do is try the first 10 or so most popular passwords and he can hack into your email account.
As an extra bonus if for whatever reason all the passwords in you email providers database are compromised all your systems will be safe since the passwords you used there are random and unrelated to your email password (KeePass generated them). Whereas if you use "Hard2h4ck" for you email password and "h.ard2H4ck" as the admin password for the server you manage the email leak gives an attacker a good starting point to attack your server.