4
votes
2answers
242 views

What steps can you take to make offline cracking of SRP harder?

In the aftermath of the Blizzard hack, what steps can I take to make offline cracking of SRP more difficult? My question assumes that your database is already gone and that you implemented SRP more ...
8
votes
3answers
514 views

Which authentication at the end of the Secure Remote Password protocol?

For the the client and server to prove to each other that they have the same premaster shared key, the original author suggests this: M = H(A | B | K) --> <-- H(A | M | K) ...
9
votes
1answer
329 views

Optimal variable sizes in the Secure Remote Password protocol

I am implementing the Secure Remote Password protocol: U = <username> --> <-- s = <salt from passwd file> a = random() A = g^a ...
6
votes
2answers
568 views

Implementing Secure Remote Password: Constructing the verifier

The SRP protocol as described in RFC 2945 generates the password verifier: x = SHA(<salt> | SHA(<username> | ":" | <raw password>))` v = g^x % N I have three questions: why use ...
6
votes
3answers
941 views

Using Secure Remote Password without sending the username in the clear

To initiate a key exchange using the SRP protocol the client sends the username so the server can look up the salt and password verifier. Is there a simple way to change this so that an evesdropper ...
5
votes
1answer
236 views

Using Secure Remote Password without embedding the modulus

The SRP protocol as described by the author assumes that the large safe prime modulus and generator are embedded into the client and server rather than being transmitted as part of the protocol. ...