2
votes
2answers
259 views

Can unencrypted keys & logins be kept out of program memory?

No matter what technique is used to store encryption keys & logins, it seems that all roads lead back to program memory (as far as I know), as an unencrypted version of the keys & logins will ...
5
votes
3answers
308 views

An OS that does not trust its RAM?

I wonder if it is possible to write a kernel that would keep all of its RAM encrypted, storing the key in the CPU cache, so that the machine would be resistant to cold-boot attacks?
4
votes
3answers
161 views

Is there a common name for a software defect that leads to unexpected transfer of secret over the wire?

Suppose in a C++ program I use a memory region for temporarily storing an encryption key and don't overwrite that region afterwards. Then my program wants to send a data packet over the network. Due ...
13
votes
6answers
1k views

How can the impact of cold boot attacks be minimized?

Short of powering down and maintaining physical security for sufficient time, what are effective strategies for keeping keys from being disclosed by cold-boot attacks, and can anything be done without ...