Cryptographic primitives usually assert some security level given as number of operations to mount an attack. Hash functions, for example, give different security levels for collision attacks, ...
On the surface, the inadvisability of security through obscurity is directly at odds with the concept of shared secrets (i.e. "passwords"). Which is to say: if secrecy around passwords is valuable, ...
Let's say I have a message that I want to keep safe for the next 100 years. Is it theoretically possible? Let's say the message is unique (raw picture data, raw video video data, raw text data) and ...
Assume I have a function encrypt(mes,key) where mes is the message, and key is the key. The length of key is 64 bits. Last but not least: assume the only way to crack my cipher is a brute-force ...
Are there some good papers (or discussions) on using Markov chains or Hidden Markov Models for password auditing/cracking?
As a programmer and language enthusiast I've been very interested in Markov chains for some time. Considering the influence of natural language on password and passphrase selection (by humans of ...
It's established wisdom to hash password multiple times with a salt to increase the time it takes per brute force iteration. At the same time (unless the algorithm guarantees otherwise) there's a ...
Schneier's law (which should probably be called Babbage's Law). States that: Anyone, from the most clueless amateur to the best cryptographer, can create an algorithm that he himself can't ...
Note: this question arises purely from a theoretical interest in security research. Frequently in popular fiction we see white-hat hackers decrypt secret information in a matter of seconds. While ...