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45

Disclaimer: Although I consider myself technically knowledgeable about the mentioned issues and I've included references where they exist, some parts of this answer are speculative. TL;DR: Publishing scans without being identified is a though proposition. There are multiple risks of information leak, and mitigation is technically complex. However, anyone ...


11

Buy the scanner in cash, and buy a PC from some PC junker shop in cash. Make sure you never input any information about your name etc into the computer. If everything is bought in cash, and you have a virgin OS with only alias information about yourself, then there should be no correct metadata to encode. There are certain programs which do encode ...


3

To quote The Grugq on this: "VPNs provide privacy - Tor provides anonymity. Confuse the two at your peril." So, don't use VPN for anonymity but use it to protect your privacy instead. Update: to answer your questions in a more direct manner: Given this set-up, has VPN B any chance to identify an user? so how could VPN B identify a single user? ...


4

If you route your traffic throught two VPNs you'll gain a lot of anonymity. However you're not anonymous to every possible attacker, as an attacker could break both VPNs (NSA broke quite a lot VPNs), so an attacker could backtrace your connection from your target, break B, break A and get your IP - and this is what you wanted to avoid. So at most an ...


1

It depends on what you're trying to defend against. If you're trying to prevent a site operator from identifying who you as a user are, multiple VPNs won't gain you anything. The operator will see the traffic as coming from the endpoint of the final VPN regardless of how many there are in the chain. You're still vulnerable to being identified through ...


0

Not really. Your question is about security and privacy of your data in transit, but you don't trust the endpoints. You can secure the route all you want, but it's difficult to force all applications to use it, especially those that compromise you from the other end of the VPN.


1

Telecommunication providers have the ability to get your IMEI. If you used your normal SIM in a phone, then the new SIM in the same phone, they can link it to each other. This way, companies may compromise your anonymity.


1

Your Amazon purchased hardware provides identity information unique to the phone and unrelated to the SIM card. You have linked the phone to yourself through that Amazon purchase and also via the previous use of that device with a SIM card with your identity. The IMEI appears to be your main problem. Please see details of identifiers here - ...


0

I could hash the IP to 16 bits and store those 16 bits. Then there'd be 65 536 possible hashed values, and for each one of those hashes, there'd be roughly 65 536 possible IPs that maps to that value. Or hash the IP to only 8 bits, so that there'd be only 256 possible hashes, each one stemming from any one of roughly 2^(32 - 8) = 16 777 216 IPs. This would ...


0

When your system makes DNS requests without the anonymisation network you are normally using an eavesdropper is able to predict which sites you are visiting. Assume you want to visit https://security.stackexchange.com/. Your browser makes a DNS request and sends it to your anonymisation network, which in turn requests the site. So the eavesdropper has an ...


1

DNSSEC does not protect against eavesdropping, in this respect it only signs the response so the client knows it has not been spoofed: It is a set of extensions to DNS which provide to DNS clients (resolvers) origin authentication of DNS data, authenticated denial of existence, and data integrity, but not availability or confidentiality. Emphasis ...


3

There are certain algorithms that allow you to do calculations on encrypted values. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Homomorphic_encryption however the things are still slow and impractical. What you can do in your example is create two 'machines'. When you insert a ballot in your apparatus, one machine independently counts votes (which hole you punched), the ...


0

If you do DNS over your local unencrypted network, a third party could see what names you were looking up and might be able to glean some information out of those lookups. If you're a deep-cover CIA operative somewhere and they can see that you're going to super-sekret-email.cia.gov, well, even without that traffic you might be in trouble. There's also a ...



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