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12

Most things of importance placed in a data center have a sister installation in a physically separate data center, and if there was a reason to "fail over" from the live to the backup site, it's completely plausible that things like data shipping will occur as part of it. It also will result in a flurry of manual and semi-automatic administrative activity, ...


12

There is no good way. What you say, is practically the measurement of the password distance in our mind. It is clearly impossible to have a direct method to do that. Second thing, what you want to measure, depends heavily on the person, and contains often only for him known informations. For example, one of your collegues could use the name of its childs on ...


9

You're in luck, there is a good way to normalize this for publicly available information: WolframAlpha can be used to reduce strings into logical components that can be compared, and result in a more accurate Levenshtein comparison. Example for "Monday" Once you "factor" the string into all of its possible meanings (day of week, scrabble value, etc) you ...


6

You probably were hacked because you were an easy target. And even if there are no important data at your site it can be valuable to point people to a seemingly innocent and trusted host and get them infected by drive-by-downloads etc. In your case it looks more like your host was used for SEO optimizations, by linking typical phrases to external hosts and ...


4

Nope, I don't think @munkeyoto has got the right idea. The following passage is from Bruce Schneier's Secret And Lies. There’s the so-called salami attack of stealing the fractions of pennies, one slice at a time, from everyone’s interest-bearing accounts; this is a beautiful example of something that just would not have been possible without ...


3

You could try to put the file on a filesystem which is mounted as read-only. That would at least thwart any attack which uses the normal attack path via file access over the operating system. However, when the malware doesn't use the normal filesystem and does instead attack the raw hard drive devices, this will not help you. The best way to restore a file ...


3

A fire is a real threat in a datacenter, but it would certainly not be handled with an emergency data backup. Server Fault has some discussion about what to do in a fire; the consensus there was that as soon as it was identified as an actual fire, you press the emergency poweroff button and release the fire suppressant on your way out the door, and call the ...


3

The question itself relies on some pretty critical, and invalid, assumptions: We know who the attacker is. We know what the attacker does and does not know. We know that the attacker does not know about zero-day vulnerabilities in our system. The attacker's level of knowledge and skill is static. A system can be absolutely safe. We cannot assume to know ...


3

That is correct: clients that do not support TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV cannot benefit from the server's implementation. However, understanding the intent of the feature may help put your mind at ease. There are broadly 2 categories of TLS/SSL implementations: modern and legacy. Modern implementations use recent TLS versions (though they may be locked into older ...


3

Assuming you're just throwing data at a closed port, your friend will notice a substantial slowdown in his Internet connectivity and an increase in packet loss, but it will not result in an inability to use the Internet. Think of his connection as a pipe: you're trying to throw 4Mbps down a 4Mbps pipe, and he's trying to pull additional data down. ...


2

This is a pretty scary thing to be doing, as by definition, you are wanting to look at sensitive, user-submitted data on those computers. Sure, you might catch the occasional wrongdoer, but you're going to be capturing quite a lot of normal people's passwords, emails, etc. Which is probably opening a whole slew of liability to whoever owns the computer lab. ...


2

You ask: why? What do they have to gain? Were people being hurt by this code? The answer is simple, you are a resource. Attackers go after many sites because they're simply low hanging fruit, a means to an end. Because someone may visit your site, they did it to target your visitors. It is a means to an end. The more people that visit their links via ...


2

In fake authentication attack there are two types of WEP authentication (Open System and Shared Key) you can only do fake authentication for WEP enabled AP. This useful when you need an associated MAC address in various aireplay-ng for example in WEP cracking attack when there is no associated client. It should be noted that the fake authentication attack ...


2

If you want a physical threat, you'd need something that would be a threat to data, but not people. Acid corroding the server stack, for example, might be better. Bob could trigger a backup in safety while racing against time to save what data he could before the server was irrecoverable.


2

A couple of pitfalls with ECC: Invalid curve attacks: Attacker encodes a point which is not on the curve and has low order. Deadly attack on Diffie-Hellman. I don't think this can be exploited with ECDSA since there is no attacker controlled point. Point on twist on a non twist secure curve: Same as above, but works for compressed points as well. Incorrect ...


1

Your firewall rules look good to me. In particular, the "default deny" for outbound packets means that it should be blocking the packets in the report from your ISP. Are you sure your server is the source of the packets? It's easy to forge the source address for UDP packets.


1

You're assuming the attacker has knowledge of both devices. The particular address you've listed is no stranger to random attacks. SANS Internet Storm Center lists it, it has appeared on other watch lists as well. One can conclude that this is either part of a botnet or some other automated scanning/hacker/badguy machine. Botnets, compromised machines, ...


1

Keeping in mind that this is fiction, your scenario could work given some qualifications. Perhaps there was some major breakthrough that day in the study, so it was worth the risk to backup the data on demand.


1

Any data can be encrypted; there's nothing you can do to make arbitrary data unencryptable.* As for "a honeypot with a file to somehow reveal the key needed to decrypt the rest of the files," that's what's called a chosen-plaintext attack. Some encryption methods are susceptible to it, but for that reason they're not generally used in the real world. ...


1

Nothing is "absolutely safe" there will always be a way to crack into any system given enough time and resources. If you have patched all the latest software that's awesome! But that doesn't mean you still don't have to take precautions against weak passwords, spear phishing attacks, or weak code that doesn't prevent vulnerabilities such as SQL injection. ...



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