New answers tagged

0

Yep, as Lie Ryan says, a forum admin (or any other adversary) cannot edit a signature (or the data that was signed) created using your private key, and have the signature still verify, unless the adversary has your private key too. Having your public key doesn't help. In fact, the entire point of the public key is that you distribute it to everybody; without ...


1

A malicious forum administrator cannot forge the signed text in such a way that it will look like it comes from your key pair. However, a malicious forum administrator can replace both your public key and signed text, with his own public key and signed text, and display it to the person(s) you're communicating with, while still showing you your own public ...


0

What issues might I run into if I generate and sign the notice? Not considering the practical issues with paper-based digital signatures, let's consider what an attacker could do with your signed message. Consider the attacker a man in the middle: he's broking the information between you and possible readers of the records. Obviously he cannot modify it ...


2

Auditing and alerting is the general approach to insider threats. If you make sure that activity on sensitive systems is heavily logged and monitored, you dramatically increase the difficulty of subverting those systems. Typically, you'd log and alert on any logons, and maintain an audit log of all actions taken on the system. To protect those logs from ...


2

Perhaps you are overthinking this. When you say: Now imagine a malicious inside attacker changes the application code... You are then trying to guess what the application code will be changed to, and are trying to come up with a solution for that particular change. The problem is, if they can change the code in the first place, they can change it to ...


1

Asymmetric algorithms are designed to have a pair of keys: the public key, which is disseminated to anyone, and the private key, which is retained by the individual or system that generated the key pair. The keys are special in that ONLY the private key can decrypt messages encrypted with the public key, and only the public key can decrypt messages encrypted ...


3

In an asymmetric algorithm you have two keys. Lets call them A and B. Whatever you encrypt with A, you have to decrypt with B. Whatever you encrypt with B, you have to decrypt with A. (This is true for not all, but most asymmetric algorithms. Also, in practical implementations it is a bit more complicated, see techrafs comment.) One of these keys are chosen ...


1

Using PGP, the answer is to use a signing subkey, you can then attach the subkey to an unusable ("stub") master key and use that in everyday work. If that key is lost, the certification key can be used to designate a new signing subkey; the recipient will need to update the key from a keyserver though. With X.509, no such mechanism exists. For both, you ...


7

It is a matter of speed and convenience, for the most part. Your basic options for signing a key: Both participants set up their computers next to each other, one reads off their fingerprint, the other verifies at the same time, then the key is signed immediately. One participant shows their computer screen with the fingerprint to the other, who writes ...


31

Firstly, that statement doesn't mean "don't bring a computer"; it means " you don't need to bring a computer". Many people going to their first key signing party are likely to assume that, since the keys are intended for use on computers, they will need to bring a computer containing their keys, signatures, or encryption software. What actually happens is ...


73

Quote from Wikipedia: Although PGP keys are generally used with personal computers for Internet-related applications, key signing parties themselves generally do not involve computers, since that would give adversaries increased opportunities for subterfuge. Rather, participants write down a string of letters and numbers, called a public key ...


0

You've already mentioned the stateless federated benefits of JWTs, I'm sure those can be agreed on. An attacker doesn't need a user's password to access protected resources, just access to their authentication context. I think one of the risks that you're missing with sever-side tokens, or session based methods, is that those identifiers are also stored on ...


2

Taking a look at git signing process, it says that only commit information can be source verified by this method. After version 1.8.3, git can also sign commits and merge requests. The person who execute those operations provides the gpg key password for signing, and everyone that looks at the commit, tag and merge can see if it comes from a "trusted ...



Top 50 recent answers are included