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1

Yes, it is possible. You encrypt the whole partition so that a master password is needed at boot. Things to consider: it will still be possible (not easy) to access the virtual machine's "virtual RAM", and in some cases also modify it, in a version of the "cold boot attack". Systems that are invulnerable to CBA are being studied, but these results will ...


2

Install TrueCrypt on your virtual machine and setup Full-Disk Encryption (you don't need anything after step 11). That way whoever boots that VM will have to enter a password, and nobody will be able to extract data from it. As Tinned_Tuna has mentioned, it's important to limit access to the host machine, as someone could easily install a keylogger to steal ...


3

I believe there is a misconception of how data encryption works on current SSDs. Data are written from the host to the device in 8bit/10bit format. On the level of the link layer the data are converted back to 8bit /byte format and then sent to the cache (either DRAM or SRAM). If the controller supports encryption (most of them do) the data are then ...


0

USB flash drive with a hardware write-protect switch are available , though you'll have to go to some effort to pick one up. That page also details some software tricks that I don't recommend but might work for non-sophisticated threats.


3

If the encryption software stores meta-data or other (unencrypted) signatures/magic-numbers, or verifiable structures, then these can be used for identification of course — but, since this gives the game away in a sense, you'll find that the better ones explicitly do not, e.g. from the Truecrypt volume format specification: TrueCrypt volumes have no ...


19

There are a number of defenses you can use to help prevent and recover from theft. The first thing you should look into is full-disk encryption, e.g. LUKS, TrueCrypt, or PGP. This will prevent an attacker from reading any data on the disk, even if they steal the hardware. You will need to enter the password at boot, though, so for unattended remote hardware ...


7

Going by your threat model which is theft of the server, I would choose to go with full disk encryption in the form of LUKS or similar. For that threat model though, encryption shouldn't be your focus. Instead, make sure your datacentre has appropriate physical security in the form of access control, surveillance and the likes.


1

I remember hearing about LoJack for laptops in the past. I did some research, and they claim they have some BIOS-integrated feature that would allow tracking, I'm not sure if this could be succesfully combined with full disk encryption From a PC Mag Review: Persistence Furthers Along with the main application agent, LoJack includes an invisible ...


5

Disk encryption is about preventing access to data, unless a specific authentication token (e.g. a password) is presented. Full disk encryption is about doing that on the whole disk, including the OS, so the machine won't even boot without the password. If it does not boot, then, in particular, Prey won't work. What you can do is to allow the machine to ...



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