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The first part of a targeted attack (i.e. to penetrate a network) is to find out as much as possible about the target. It is very common that a company uses the same domain name in the internal network as it does for public available sites. It is also very common that the name of host describes its purpose. If you don't use Split DNS that would mean that ...


1

FCrDNS should only be required when the end user needs to properly identify itself with a domain or organization, commonly used for email where the from address header should match the PTR of the sending IP (IPv4 or IPv6 Address). Actually Tom, if you notice Google requires IPv6 initiated email connections to have a proper RDNS, so that's out. The fact is ...


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Truncated simply means that the packet was larger then the client expected. E.g. if the client expects only 512 bytes by doing recv(fd,buf,512,0) but the message is larger the recv will fail because the message does not fit. With the flag MSG_TRUNC the client can get the truncated message, but not the full message because it does not fit in the allocated ...


3

Suppose Victim A has your standard off-the-shelf Linksys wireless router which, by default, doesn't have encryption enabled on the wireless network which it broadcasts. Suppose Victim A never changed the default administration password either to gain access into the router's web interface to change settings (usually admin, admin). These two situations are ...


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You can do ARP spoofing to make victim send DNS queries to you (the attacker). You can then reply with DNS type A records having an IP address that you control. The SSL certificate validation, will however fail because you will not be able to impersonate as Facebook when doing SSL key establishment.


0

Yes, you can "say" you know fb.com's IP, but give them your own. - I forget what the attack is called at the moment :) You can pretend to be Facebook in that you have a webpage that looks like Facebook's (and use something like SSLStrip to stop automatic redirects to HTTPS), but if the client FORCES use of SSL, you can't spoof Facebook's certificate. Is ...


2

You should read A Question of DNS Protocols by Geoff Huston, which is an actual investigation into this idea, with statistics and everything: If the DNS represents such a significant vulnerability for the Internet through these UDP-based reflection attacks, then does TCP represent a potential mitigation? Could we realistically contemplate moving ...


1

The following solution might not scale well, but: Set up BIND or similar DNS resolver server on the host you want to protect Configure it to validate DNSSEC (can take maximum 10 minutes) Configure a software firewall so that only your DNS server can query the upstream DNS servers Optionally use a browser addon which can display the DNSSEC status You can ...


1

The real AS to feed a false route is any AS along the AS path: 7908 --> 20080 --> 1251 --> |28571| |52888| --> 6447 you see in the 2 wrong announces of route to: 8.8.8.8/32 Hence all traffic toward 8.8.8.8/32 shoud be routed since this attack through ASes: |28571| |52888| --> 1251 --> 20080 --> 7908 ...


3

DNS is only used to resolve domain names to IP addresses so there is certainly the risk that the domain can be hijacked if your DNS provider turns out to be untrustworthy. I think the question you really want to ask is what a person can do by hijacking a domain name (i.e. control the DNS records). The problems or risks that can arise are very similar to ...



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