New answers tagged ip-spoofing
Short answer: Yes, but not as possible as it used to be, and dependent upon how literally one takes your question. Long answer: I notice that you did not ask "Is it possible to carry on a TCP conversation with a spoofed IP address" - that question was ably answered by @symcbean. You specifically asked "Is it possible to pass TCP handshake with spoofed IP ...
Without access to the network behind one of the allowed IP addresses or access to a machine behind one of the allowed IP addresses, you can not pass a TCP 3-way handshake with a spoofed IP address.
Short answer: no. Longer answer: yes, if you control a router device close to the target device (it has to be on the path between the the real source IP address and the target, and on the path between the faked IP address and the target) or if the target network/host accepts source-routed packets.
A side channel attack is a classification of attacks and not specific to any one exploit. Therefore referring to a "side channel attack" could mean any number of threats. The only side channel attack that I know of involving printers is an acoustic side channel attack. It is impossible for an attacker to spoof their IP address over the open internet due ...
In a shared hosted environment, there could be thousands of domains on one server. This would mean, whomever administrates the server would have to possibly create thousands of rules, and consistently change those rules. It would make no sense for a company to take on that burden, in fact it would be costly. Hosting providers such as JustHost, ThePlanet, ...
Although it may technically possible for a competent Linux system admin to configure whitelisted IP addresses per login, that does not mean that the software that Justhost uses can do such a thing. For my reseller hosting I use Plesk, and Plesk does not support this feature even though the underlying OS and toolchain is capable.
The uplink will still be saturated. The only way to mitigate this is to turn on RRL on servers and get ride of open resolvers. And for legitimate open resolvers, have them send UDP packets as small as possible with the TC bit set ("please retry using TCP") so that amplification doesn't happen yet it doesn't break legitimate traffic. Other mitigation ...
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