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4

1: Use hardware tokens, like a Yubikey configured for challenge-response based authentication. Or smartcards. You load up the key on them all and hand them out. They're designed to keep the secrets secret. 2: Stop using a single key, start using one keypair per user for accountability and practical revocability.


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It highly depends on what software you're using to manage the keys. For example, the proprietary crypto library we use here splits the key over several memory locations, flips them big-endian / little-endian, etc and only reassembles them when they're needed. Any good crypto / key management tool will have its own bag of similar obfuscation tricks. This will ...


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I'd recommend reading the original paper on the Cold Boot attack. Section 6 explains "Identifying keys in memory." They wrote an app called "keyfind" that you might be able to search for.


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In some cases it might actually compromise the security of it. http://www.di.ens.fr/~fouque/pub/crypto07b.pdf HMAC-MD5 has a key recovery attack in the upper end of achievable but impractical, although attacks only get better over time.


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You can use the MD5 cryptography hash without any serious concern but why not consider using the public key to confirm the private key in question. You could have the partner sign a sample binary and use the public key to confirm the signature and thereby confirm the private key. If you want to work outside the signing infrastructure you could use a ...


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WARNING: Creativity ahead, which is often bad for security (at least without thorough review). This sounds like a case in which an SSH agent could be useful. An SSH agent provides a socket interface over which SSH clients can ask the agent to perform key operations for them, which enables the following common uses: You can have the long-running agent ...


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No, there aren't any standard formulas. The reason for that is that e.g. an AES-128 key may be used for very large amounts of data. Modes of encryption, protocol requirements and requirements on the data itself however do pose limits and those limits are usually much lower than the one for the symmetric cipher. Say that you could use an AES key to encrypt ...


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Am I right thinking that it is NOT relevant for the tokens based on mathematically reversible cryptographic functions? You're right. But you may not want to do it that way. Tokens are generally isomorphic to card numbers (15-16 digit numeric) because they are supposed to be able to easily replace card numbers in whatever software the recipient uses. ...


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If you're doing this to avoid entering passwords, then that implies that either you'll run an SSH agent on Production, or you'll keep an unencrypted private key there. If it's the latter, then the administrators of Production will have access to your development box. But if I'm reading between the lines correctly, you're using this approach as a workaround ...


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Tracking down the links referenced in the answers, I think it would be safe. Out of an abundance of caution, I will exclude the private key from the list of md5sum values I allow to be stored on computers connected to the Internet. I will then use the signatures generated for the same binary to confirm the excluded private keys are identical. Even if ...


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Looking at your comment on @zedman9991's answer; if you want to check that the servers' filesystems are identical, why not generate one hash for the whole filesystem, rather than one hash per file? This will likely fail on two different severs since operating systems generate files like candy, timestamps / MAC addresses will differ, etc, so it might be ...



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