New answers tagged man-in-the-middle
0
In addition to the replay and ordering issues identified by jhoyla, there is no entity or message origin authentication in this protocol.
Any party with the public key of either peer can send arbitrary messages to the peer, and the peer has no way of authenticating their origin. Indeed, they could even fake a conversation between two peers, especially if ...
2
This protocol is vulnerable to a replay attack.
In common notation
A -> I_B: {m}_PK(B)
I_A -> B: {m}_PK(B)
I_A -> B: {m}_PK(B)
If m was a message saying loan me $10 and B was a little naive ...
This protocol is also vulnerable to message reordering attacks e.g.
A -> I_B: {m}_PK(B)
A -> I_B: {m'}_PK(B)
I_A -> B: {m'}_PK(B)
I_A -> B: ...
0
Out of band authentication relies on the added difficulty an attacker faces when trying to simultaneously eavesdrop on two communications. This difficulty arises due to the two channels being completely separated.
An attacker that can bring the two channels together defeats this defence. In the case of the Zeus malware, an infected PC attempts to infect ...
-1
I understand that a smartphone it's a computer with an OS, installed programs (apps) and connectivity to the Internet. So it's vulnerable to viruses. If a hacker gets your banking access data through malware, it shouldn't be difficult to get your phone number, as lots of websites are always asking that number (begining with Google, Facebook, etc.). Maybe ...
3
The threat is when the MITM owns the login screen.
If, for instance you click a link in an email that purports to be a link for https://yourbank.example but is actually a link to http://yourbank.evilbob.example, and enter the username and password you use for your bank website, Evil Bob merely needs to forward those on.
Then, https://yourbank.example ...
2
An attacker who can modify TLS record headers can actually block packets altogether, thus making the receiver wait "indefinitely". There's nothing that the TLS protocol can do to prevent that.
TLS implementations can use time-out strategies, i.e. if no activity has been received from the peer for some time (e.g. 15 seconds) then the connection can be ...
6
A man-in-the-middle attack is a simultaneous double impersonation: Charlie poses as Alice when he talks to Bob, as Bob when he talks to Alice. Since both conversations are simultaneous, Charlie can elect to pass chunks of data from Alice directly to Bob and vice-versa, adding his own parts selectively.
If Alice and Bob have a shared secret K, which Charlie ...
2
Passive-only attack scenarios tend to be rather specialized. Mostly, they involve radio links; the attacker can play with a homemade reception antenna, but is not rich enough to build an emitter which can drown out the genuine signal. This rarely applies to the Internet; this is more relevant to military on-field communications.
It could be argued that ...
2
There is a possibility to encrypt the connection to the proxy, there was a question on this site.Please find the link mentioned below.However the methods mentioned may not work at all times.
Is it possible to connect to a proxy with an ssl (or otherwise encrypted) connection?
To answer your query regarding implementing this on the network infrastructure:
...
4
Actually, Moxie Marlinspike created a tool called SSLStrip. He actually tested it on his TOR-node, and found that a lot of people didn't notice that the encryption was gone.
His talk is worth a watch: Tricks on defeating SSL
//M00kaw
6
Tor isn't safe from man-in-the-middle attacks.
The unsafe component are the Tor exit nodes. These make the actual, unencrypted request and therefore can read and modify your traffic. Tor provides anonymity by not letting them know where the request came from, but the actual traffic between the exit node and the Internet is not different from normal traffic, ...
3
Question is : why the ARP modified versions hasn't been used on large scale yet ?
What is the cost of addressing this versus the risk? ARP is a local subnet issue. If someone is already successfully on your LAN you probably have a much bigger problem because they can still do attacks at higher layers of the communications stack. Is this where you want ...
1
I know a few businesses that have implemented the 802.1x (OSI Layer 2 encryption and authentication that prevent attacks such as man and in middle attack). It takes time and money to setup it.
Switch can put each port on a separated VLAN, thus preventing man in the middle attack. Why implementing 802.1x to prevent man in the midle attacks when you can save ...
1
As a first remark, if there is no PIN during a transaction, then the card has no way of being sure that it is the real "you" who is currently holding it. So, if someone steals your card, he can go in full shopping-orgy mode at your expense.
A magnetic strip is no different from a few letters inked on the card, except that the strip is read by a magnetic ...
2
In short: yes, it is very likely possible.
If the magnetic strip and the RFID are not related, then even if the data were encrypted the setup would not be secure. It would be too easy to slip the data off the original card (you can do that with a tape recorder head, and there are even iPhone apps to do that, by interfacing with the audio jack), clean them ...
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