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In my department, I am involved in mobile device security, and have looked into a product that does just what you're looking for. The product that I am familiar with is FireEye Mobile Threat Prevention. https://www.fireeye.com/products/mobile-threat-protection-mobile-security-products.html I have experienced some of the capabilities of this threat ...


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If you were able to MiTM an SSL session it means that your application isn't checking the certificate is issued by a trusted authority. Tools like Fiddler use self signed certificates, which should be rejected by a properly configured SSL layer. Unfortunately application writers often times ignore the need to check certificates and blindly trust that SSL ...


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You must carefully select: The Cipher Suites allowed by your software, some are very strong and should be privileged, some are less strong and should be enabled only if there is some compatibility concern with your service, some are weak and should be disabled at all cost. The version of SSL/TLS you allow, actually I should say the version of TLS since, ...


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First things first: If the app is prone to a mitm via wifi, changing the communication media will not solve the problem. If communication channel was the only change made, i can promptly state that yes, your app is still vulnerable to mitm attacks, the only thing the attacker needs is to have access to the carrier's network (and judging by the way they ...


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The scenario you describe qualifies as a cross-platform attack simply by the fact that one device attacks another. The mobile app containing worms may not harm the mobile device itself, but it is by any other name a malicious, infected device. When plugged into the PC, it launches the attack to that platform, thus making it a cross-platform attack. A ...


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Unfortunately no, there is no way to prevent this, but there are ways to mitigate and reduce the abuse. The reason is that eventually whatever process you are using to authenticate your client app, it can be reverse engineered and imitated in a third party app. Ways to mitigate are: using some kind of challenge response between the server and the app so ...


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Such an attack is theoretically possible, but is it likely? As always, to estimate the risk of an attack you must look at your threat model. Yours doesn't quite make sense. You are assuming a targeted attack from a sophisticated and well resourced adversary, but that such an adversary wouldn't use a fake base station and directly target your second phone. ...


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Typically you sniff mobile applications using a proxy system. You connect your phone to the proxy and then, obviously, all data runs through the computer/device which is running the proxy. Once the data is running through the proxy machine, you can simply open Wireshark, Fiddler, Charles, or your favorite sniffing tool of choice and start recording the ...


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The F-Droid App store provides Open Source apps that are often built by F-Droid (choose a source build). This requires you to trust F-Droid not to be tampering with the apk they provide (voluntarily or by getting compromised), but removes the evil-developer tampering. If you do not want to trust any app store, you will need to build the apps yourself. ...


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Here is an idea of how you could verify the integrity of source code in a binary package: Download the apk from a distributer, such as Google Play, and store the apk locally. Then compile the source code into an apk to create a sort-of identical version of the app. Then do a binary comparison of 2 apk files and look for any differences and note their ...


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Electrical tape works wonders. If you still need to be able to remote control, you will need your own IR transmitter to tape to the receiver and a more secure triggering system for the IR transmitter taped directly to it. There is no way to use the existing remotes in a secure manner.


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this post refers to a previous version of Samsung Knox: Consumer Knox. This is not the version which has enterprise and government grade security - which includes the use of MDM. It has only been available on Samsung Galaxy S4 and Note 3. No other models. Therefore no fix on other models. However, there is a new version of Knox for Consumers which is built ...


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Ares, who posted the original vulnerability, has added a couple of updates Samsung mentioned the following in their press release: "Concerning the second issue, KNOX does save the encryption key required to auto-mount the container’s file system in TrustZone. However, unlike what is implied in the blog, the access to this key is strongly controlled. Only ...



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