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1

Several options exist in gpg. Note that you can use some of these in your gpg.conf file to set them permanently (by ommitting the '--' in front of the long options): --hidden-recipient name -R Encrypt for user ID name, but hide the key ID of this user's key. This option helps to hide the receiver of the message and is a limited ...


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techerrata.com does provide MD5 checksum at its download page http://techerrata.com/browse/twrp2/flo. You can tunnel to a VPN to check if the checksums are shown up the same.


2

Let's try... First, I create a 500 MBytes file full of random bytes: dd if=/dev/urandom of=/tmp/foo bs=1000000 count=500 then I encrypt it using GnuPG, measuring the time taken by that process ("keyID" is the UID of the public key I am using): time gpg -r "keyID" --cipher-algo AES256 --compress-algo none -o /tmp/bar --encrypt /tmp/foo Total time on my ...


1

On top of what others have suggested, there's one fundamental issue here: the human side. It's not a matter of tooling or mathematical background. We have these already. What we need is to get out of For e-mail encryption to go mainstream, it needs to be the path of least resistance. As in - encrypt by default, transparently, unless the user explicitly ...


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It's nontrivial for two highly technical people to exchange email with your requirements satisfied. Accomplishing that for communications between embedded devices and people who are managing them is mind-boggling. Encrypting content is the simplest requirement. OP could use GnuPG, and give each device a unique private key. Or as Basic suggested, OP could use ...


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This depends on what you mean by "source and destination ip address." Regular internet email based on SMTP records a list of IP addresses in the headers of a message as the message traversers from one "Mail Transfer Agent" (MTA) to another. You probably think of these as "mail servers." It's not uncommon for a single message to transit several MTAs ...


0

Secure email LOL. Cryptography requires keys, and essentially the average person is just too stupid to use them properly. Until we have the technology to build a pervasive system where you somehow are the key, and whatever computer you use to send "messages," email, text, voice, video, etc, can consistently recognize you as your crypto key, encryption just ...


1

Lets take a step back. If we added some form of TLS that allowed for an "On The Fly" key exchange like we have with SSL web sites, this would already be a big step forward. Yes, PGP and related technologies that would keep your email from curious ISP's as well is an even better step forward, using an SSL/TLS style tunnel to move data between mail servers ...


3

If you want just email encryption it would probably be enough that the major mail providers include an S/MIME certificate with each mail address and use it by default inside their web interface and make it easy to use in standard mail clients. But, if you want real security and not just encryption you have to start somewhere else. The major problem is not ...


3

My amateur take on this Technically I think in short that cryptography needs to be made easier to use. This could happen if companies like Google, Microsoft, Yahoo, Facebook, etc. implemented cryptography on their web based email. While cryptography already has been made very easy (there are for example Firefox extensions/add-ons that make it easy), it ...


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Software companies and email providers Default support for PGP from Microsoft (Outlook.com and the Outlook mail client), Apple (default support in iOS and OSX), Yahoo and Gmail. They should make people aware, and create pgp-wizards to set it up with a few steps. Google can make this happen, but they have a conflict of interest, bigger than Apple or MS. ...


1

Each additional computer that has access to your keys increases your risk of being compromised. However, one way that you can greatly reduce the risk is by using a cryptographic smart card. Cryptographic smart cards store the private keys and do the encryption / decryption on the card. This means that the computer never sees the private keys. Assuming ...


2

The private key is owned by a human, not by a machine -- indeed, the normal case is that you (as a user) have one key pair, and use the private key on all machines where you need to. Having a key pair per machine would not work well; this would mean that when people send you an encrypted email, they will use one of your public keys, and you will be able to ...


2

There is an informational RFC for use of OpenPGP keys in SSL/TLS; as the RFC says: The term "OpenPGP key" is used in this document as in the OpenPGP specification [RFC4880]. We use the term "OpenPGP certificate" to refer to OpenPGP keys that are enabled for authentication. That's what these keys are for: usages as part of authentication protocols which ...


0

Well back in the day even some commercial personal-level computers had export restrictions due to the cold war and the fear of illegal technology transfer to the enemy, but the reality is that the Soviets had an incredibly elaborated network used to procure foreign technology, let alone protect theirs. From going straight to the source and bribing ...


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For a long time, cryptography was something used by spies and armies, and was weak, and a lot of the weakness was tentatively fixed by keeping algorithms and methods as secret as can be. That's security through obscurity, which is BAD, but, to be honest, algorithms from the pre-computer era were so weak that they needed secrecy; security through obscurity ...


6

It is illegal to export 128 bit symmetric encryption or certain levels of asymmetric. PGP exceeded these limits. These export control laws are why some security firms have clean room teams that build strong encryption without any US educated employees working on the team. Technically, if you learned about high strength encryption in the US, you are not ...


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PGP was considered dangerous because it could have allowed Soviet spies and military officers to plan the nuclear annihilation of the western world without the CIA realizing what's happening before it's too late. Time for some history. During World War II, the importance of cryptography for military use became apparent. Being able to crack enemy ...


2

According to Wikipedia the Arms Export Control Acts permitted (at the 1990's) only weak crypto to be exported outside the U.S.


1

I made a 16384-bit master signing key with 4096-bit subkeys using a modified version of GnuPG about a week ago. Then I imported it into a trial version of Symantec Encryption Desktop (formerly PGP Desktop). The key (and all of its subkeys): will not encrypt, sign, or decrypt anything. cannot change password. cannot modify preferences (like encryption, ...


1

Your "master key" has value only insofar as its public part can be used to verify that which was signed with it; and this includes other people. For instance, your "master key" is your ultimate resource to revoke sub-keys. So if you mind about interoperability, then you cannot make the master key as big as you would wish, even if your GnuPG binary has been ...


1

A "master signing key" (ie your identity) should be safe enough for a lifetime, because ideally you don't ever want to change it, right ? Yes, that's the idea. I am considering using 4k keys for encryption and documents signing, and a 8k+ key as "master key". That means I will use my master key only to sign my owns keys, and other ppls keys. Also ...


0

The most secure way is to verify either the short ID (B6C1D744) or the fingerprint (3DAB 6056 975A 4275 5724 C83D 34DD 35E1 C8C6 B812) with the key owner... paranoid people will do this in person, less paranoid by phone, and even less paranoid (and less secure for hopefully obvious reasons) by email.


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I'm not entirely sure how it all works, or the correct terminology, The correct terminology is called verification. I guess it depends on how paranoid one is. Yes, absolutely. There is no technical solution to these kind of problems. If you are paranoid enough, you wouldn't even trust your computer at all, because it could have been fiddled with ...


2

ECDSA is a signature algorithm. The private key for ECDSA is an integer x between 1 and n-1, where n is the size of (the subgroup of) the used elliptic curve (normally a prime number). The public key is a curve point Q equal to xG, where G is a conventional fixed point on the curve. You cannot use a signature algorithm for anything else than signing, of ...


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If you want to use ECC-based crypto, then you're looking for ECIES, although I'm unsure if using the same key for encryption and signing is a smart idea. Information on ECIES can be found here, and there are examples of how to use this in the Bouncy Castle source code. You can't use "31uEbMgunupShBVTewXjtqbBv5MndwfXhb" with any encryption scheme, because ...


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In Bitcoin the private key is in fact 256 bit random number. You could use this as the private key and create a shared secret using ECDH. The shared can be used to encrypt the message data for example using AES. Elliptic curve Diffie–Hellman (ECDH) is an anonymous key agreement protocol that allows two parties, each having an elliptic curve ...



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