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1

We have actually covered this topic off many times. The NSA is not really relevant here. What is relevant is: if you are a target, then you are unlikely to be able to secure phone. If you are not a target, then why worry. Organisations like the NSA obtain a lot of data - far too much to be able to analyse it all. Single use devices that you then discard ...


-1

The phone device itself is not a highly assuranced secure computing device because the chipboard is not designed not implemented for high assurance security computing. Even if you have a really strong 8192 bit RSA key stored in the phone to do your crypto, the memory is still open and so are the other sensors and access ports (USB, NFC ...). In a strict ...


0

This is an interesting question as it was the topic of conversation I had last night. A friend related to me that where they work was an incident where a few members of staff had a group whatsapp, which generally they used at home, however they started to use it even at work and some of the conversations included gripes about management etc. My friend who ...


0

If a single link existed, I would understand increased physical security to protect that link. However with the internet having been built on a mesh topology, traffic can take any number of routes to its destination. This gets to the point of prior posts noting it is not financially possible to physically protect all of those links. While I've never ...


1

I would suggest using a live-Linux-system, that is completely readonly. I would suggest using a USB memory with a physical write-protect switch, that prevents any modifications to the system (here is one: http://www.amazon.com/Kanguru-Flashblu-4GB-Flash-Drive/dp/B0012WDFV6/ref=pd_sim_e_1?ie=UTF8&refRID=1XS70KSFXBNH0PFQF3T9 ). Some laptops have internal ...


4

When you install the Linux OS, you have to assume that the software is the genuine one, free of backdoors. Linux distributions tend to use digital signature on packages; a digital signature does not guarantee absence of backdoor, but it prevents undetected alterations in transit: you know that the package you get is the one produced by the packager. Since ...


4

I used to be a sysadmin for the military; we were told that there were a (small) number of monitored connections between the military and public Internet -- the idea being that the military could cut itself off from the rest of the world but still maintain internal communications. I wasn't important enough to be able to personally verify whether this was ...


1

I think this has already happened in the past. Usual countermeasures are encryption secured by previously exchanged keys, monitoring of physical characteristics of a channel, and IDS. In the future quantum cryptography should solve this issue somewhat through the use of quantum entanglement. Oh, and most lines belong to private companies anyway...


11

There are a few countermeasures they typically deploy. One is encryption, which is pretty straightforward. They also monitor their fiber optics for unexpected attenuation or a change in the scattering of the light. Additionally there are ways to configure fiber to detect acoustical disturbances, theoretically detecting the tap being placed. They also have ...


30

Physical surveillance of millions of miles of buried cables would be preposterously expensive. The US government already fails at efficiently preventing illegal immigration across the Mexican/USA boundary, which is one or two orders of magnitude shorter than the total length of cables. Instead, US government does things like everybody else: with encryption ...


7

Internet lines don't need to be secured. Encryption allows one to set up a secure channel within an insecure medium. In short, no, the US does not monitor the physical lines because it doesn't need to. There is infrastructure monitoring, but that's not what you are asking about.



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