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3

The idea of the TSA padlocks is to be used on luggage and travel bags for international flights. They are not designed to be used for high security purposes, so they will be extremely easy to pick open, but when in an airport would someone have the time or the equipment to pick open your bag while you were not looking? They all have a key override which is ...


0

In response to (1), yes it could provide a path, but it's unlikely for just about any organization under some reasonable assumptions. In particular, it's possible to access GMail and Google Drive from a browser that only supports JavaScript, so the standard browser sandbox means that Google itself shouldn't be able to read or change any files on your ...


24

They're all master keyed. They're embarrassingly insecure locks on their own. Case in point: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xtJx3j7AhQk


1

Cloning an FDE disk yields another FDE disk. It'll be encrypted so, not much in the way of worries there. The scenario where a copy of all the unencrypted data from an FDE disk is pilfered (is probably what you are actually wanting to know about) must take place through the operating system or with the decryption key. Operating systems are generally ...


1

OK I have been noodling on this for long enough to take a swing at what I think the OP is asking. Tripwire security I would classify the functionality "shut down unless user does one very specific thing" as a pretty conventional tripwire. An application for most operating systems would be trivial (but unique) to code like this: on event keypress "d" ...


1

Just dipping my toes in here for a second. Sometimes a mouse can move a minuscule amount by itself due to the surroundings (ghosts, furnace/AC blower, rumbling traffic outside or worst case a real mouse). I frequently find my PC on after I have it in sleep mode overnight and I know there was no one on it as I live alone. A slight movement for whatever ...


0

There is never a need for this type of behavior. Physical access to a machine can be regulated with a safe. and the Machine itself can be build with Keyboard support disabled. (why would you need that on a 'service' machine anyway) All that remains is network access and that can be controlled through other means. (SSH with certificates / Firewall / IP ...


1

I do not know what OS you are using, but if you are so security conscious I suppose that you lock your computer before leaving it. Therefore, to connect, one should try a few password. Failed connections should be logged, and you have plenty of log monitoring software offering active response upon log events. With such a software, you can for instance ...


2

If it is a PSTN line a simple tape recorder attached to the lines could do the trick. For ISDN I suspect you need a DAC but its also easy, as long as you have physical access to the line. Any connection using a Telephone line (digital or analogue) is easy to understand for anyone that knows the encoding schema. To realy protect it you should use the same ...


4

When you're installing an OS you'll almost always be creating partitions and formatting them anyway, so any previous data left on the drive shouldn't be an issue, unless this "data" is actually malicious and designed to exploit a vulnerability in the filesystem creation tool, but I haven't heard of such flaws yet. The only exception would be Windows which ...


3

Unfortunately I would have to agree with the poster named "Freedom" who has made the observation that you cannot trust U.S.-manufacturered, -owned or -designed systems. The Snowden revelations proved far beyond a reasonable doubt that not only the NSA (but a long list of other "alphabet-soup" U.S. surveillance state entities), long ago declared war against ...


0

Yes it is a realistic threat. Here is a tutorial on how this is done. The SAM file can be retrieved and cracked. Alternatively, new credentials can be injected in the SAM file. Defences include physically securing the computer, or (you've said it yourself) - encrypt the hard drive so it requires a password on boot.


2

Yes the risk is very big. NSA is know to put spyware on hardware before shipping (see here), NSA is know to ignore the US constitutions and spy on calls and internet activity of US citizens so do you really think they care about foreigners? If they seize your laptop and you ever get your hands back on it, throw it on the trash its junk now. I can bet ...


4

Though you might expect this if traveling to certain countries, this question hinges on whether we should trust the authorities (or a specific person, still an opinion) and somewhat separately known capabilities (which are broad). An essential answer is the risk you're willing to accept. You could say you can't trust your device if it ever leaves your ...


2

Law #3: If a bad guy has unrestricted physical access to your computer, it's not your computer anymore. (https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/hh278941.aspx) This is definitely a realistic threat. The question is whether you need to worry about it. If you can't guarantee that someone will not have unfettered access to your PC then you should be ...


0

No organization's objective is "security." The purpose of sensitive information is not its own existence, but its application to organizational objectives. This is to say that any effort in security takes away from real organizational objectives - it's detrimental. That said, let me follow your question directly. With a question: "Strict" in what way? It ...


5

There are a lot of complex issues, mainly related to effort and trust dynamics, that undermine security policies in organisations. Whilst individual factors have been uncovered by researchers, there isn't as of yet a single unified theory of what security management styles are preferable or of what policies to implement in every single organisation. The ...


11

What you are pointing is the difference between imposing security rules to people and involving people to get better security. Chances are that you will find this video quite interesting. After a walk through issues quite similar to the one you mention, the presenter (Jayson E. Street to name him) ends up by talking about positive enforcement. It makes the ...


2

The simplest is to have it set up as an encrypted partition. To wipe, simply lose the passphrase. That easy. Sure, you have to use a framework that doesn't leak the passphrase or store it anywhere accessible, but this way has been tried and tested, and it works.


0

The typical way accelerate wiping is to encrypt the partition and then overwrite a necessary disk sector. (As opposed to having to overwrite the whole partition.) But this is detectable. One alternative is something called "Deniable Encryption". TrueCrypt allows you to do this. The idea is to have one encrypted blob of data to decrypt to more than one ...



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