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1

McNerdHair is correct to require you to use an authenticated mode. There are more options than GCM mode though: GCM mode is fast. It is sometimes called a 1.5 pass authenticated mode because of the fast GMAC calculation. It is standardized by NIST. CCM mode is another NIST certified mode specifically created for packet encryption, i.e. transport mode ...


5

You should always use an AEAD mode if you can, especially over the network. Crypto++ seems to support GCM, which is a good AEAD mode that has seen use in TLS 1.2. (There are others that are just as good, but TLS's "star power" lends GCM a lot of credibility.) Importantly, AEAD modes authenticate "additional data." This is unencrypted data not included with ...


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TLDR: in limited cases yes, but don't First, key-exchange and authentication aren't really independent in SSL/TLS. Although there are sometimes a few choices available, many combinations you could reasonably choose do not exist as ciphersuites. (Unlike for example SSH, where the pieces are negotiated separately and you can get any combination as long as ...


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A TLS cipher consists of a part defining the authentication of the certificate (i.e. ECDSA, RSA...), a part defining the key exchange (ECDHE, DHE...) and a part about the kind of symmetric encryption and the associated HMAC, i.e. RC4+SHA1, AES128+SHA256 etc. From these parts only the authentication part depends on the type of certificate and everything ...


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I don't see anyway to reconcile these two RFCs There are two ways to reconcile them: Choose Security (RFC 7465) over Backwards Compatibility (RFC 3501) Choose Backwards Compatibility (RFC 3501) over Security (RFC 7465) I have seen that Google has turned off RC4 on its email servers and is requiring TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, but that'...


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RFC 7525 provides recommendations on how to deal with TLS protocols and ciphers today, including: 4.1. General Guidelines ... o Implementations MUST NOT negotiate RC4 cipher suites. And it is applicable to IMAP too: 5. Applicability Statement ... o Email software and services that wish to protect IMAP, POP3, or SMTP traffic with TLS....



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