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11

A "sandbox" is a play area for young children: it is supposed to be safe for them (they cannot hurt themselves) and safe from them (it is sand, they cannot break it). In the context of IT security, "sandboxing" means isolating some piece of software in such a way that whatever it does, it will not spread havoc elsewhere. A common Unix way of sandboxing is ...


11

Google Chrome OS is a Linux-based operating system on which Chrome is the browser and focuses on the use of the online applications that belong to Google (Google Drive, Youtube ...). It is the direct competetor with Windows OS of Microsoft. Centos OS is also a Linux-based operating system but unlike Chrome OS which runs on mobiles, Centos OS is widely ...


10

Chroot wouldn't give you any security anyway, it's only designed for very specific use cases. See Debian unstable chroot security issues and chroot "jail" - what is it and how do I use it?. Any application that has access to the X server can do a lot of things. It can snoop on other applications that display windows on the same server. It can log key ...


9

It seems to me you're discussing two things: sandboxing on the desktop and then strategies for user content access in sandboxed applications. Sandboxing There are many sandboxing models out there, including the ones used by OSes: Windows 8 WinRT Store Apps OS X Sandboxed Store Apps iOS Apps Android Apps Some apps are shipped sandboxed, for instance ...


8

Codepad explains how they provide security on their about page: codepad.org is an online compiler/interpreter. [...] The strategy is to run everything under ptrace, with many system calls disallowed or ignored. Compilers and final executables are both executed in a chroot jail, with strict resource limits. [...] Rather than rely on just the chroot ...


8

According to the diagram on the NACL site, the NACL code runs with the same privileges as the renderer which is a reduced privilege process. If NACL fails, an attacker can take over the renderer, giving them access to resources in the same renderer process (set of frames that could be in the same domain after some set of document.domain sets). "The ...


7

The most secure approach is to run the proprietary software in a virtual machine (VM). This is pretty simple to set up, and you can find free VMs (e.g., VirtualBox). However, since you mention games, this may not work for games (it may produce unacceptable performance degradation in some graphics-intensive games). Another possibility is to install a ...


7

The term "sandbox" is wide, generic, and often misused and misunderstood. Let's consider a type of sandbox, a virtual machine running under control of an hypervisor. The guest system is nominally isolated and cannot "see" the host system. However, this is relative to the implementation of the hypervisor, which is a combination of software and hardware, both ...


7

Honestly some people need a wake up call before they take responsibility for their mistakes. Give the company a set time, like one month from today to release a patch. If they do not comply post information about the vulnerability on the Full Disclosure Mailinglist. By not making this information public then you are risking that organized crime will ...


6

Why aren't applications sandboxed by default on Windows? I don't know, but I'm guessing it is a mixture of the following reasons: Sandboxing breaks many applications, in complex and subtle ways. Users will be unhappy if Windows turns on a new feature by default that breaks even one of their applications. It is very, very difficult to design an ...


6

On Linux, you can reliably monitor a selection of system calls or file accesses with the audit subsystem. Make sure the auditd daemon is running, then configure what you want to log with auditctl. Each logged operation is recorded in /var/log/audit/audit.log (on typical configurations). You'll find simple examples of auditctl usage on this site, on Server ...


6

There are two approaches, the quantitative and the qualitative. The quantitative consists of fuzzing the input to the sandboxing driver. Use a fuzzing framework like Peach, Sulley or other to fuzz that input and look for crashes or file operations outside the sandbox. The qualitative approach involves reverse engineering and understand the sandboxing ...


6

See this question for a sense on how secure VMs really are. How secure are virtual machines really? False sense of security? A good general rule is to not allow the VMs to communicate with each other through networking. This means proper measure to segregate network access should be enforced. If you notice a compromise on any of the VMs, immediately nuke ...


5

Your edit clarifies that you are talking about privacy and anonymity: "eliminate local evidence that you went to the website". That changes the question a bit, as it clarifies you are talking about anonymity, not protection from malware. The best way to achieve those privacy and anonymity goals is as follows: For web browsing, use Tor. For chat, use ...


5

The implementation of the virtual machine is a kernel for the kernel. In a typical operating system, there is application code (aka "userland") and kernel code. They use the same set of instructions; however, the CPU knows, at any time, whether it is executing application or kernel code. When application code tries to execute some opcodes which access the ...


5

It doesn't matter where your run your browser from. You can run it off of your USB drive or off a network share, it still goes into system memory. Malware that would exploit that browser would have the privileges of the user that ran the browser. Use Chrome or any other browser to browse to file:///C:/ or about:memory. The browser like any other process, ...


5

A sandbox is like a special "section" of your computer that has been blocked off from accessing the rest of your computer. In a perfect sandbox you can do anything you want within it, but it will not effect the rest of your computer. This is used as a form of security, keeping any malware you might download from being able to affect the rest of your ...


4

I'm far from being a PHP expert, so my comments are more general rather than specific. Probably not entirely, but it depends. I don't think that any whitelist/blacklist approach can ever be 100% accurate. There will always be a case of false positives or false negatives. So you're always balancing between hits (of a script being able to still penetrate ...


4

No. Sandboxes aren't overrated. They've very useful. They are not a silver bullet -- they don't solve every security problem -- but they do have substantial value. Really, don't think this is especially new. If you read the original paper describing the Chrome security architecture, it clearly explains why sandboxing is valuable while also elucidating ...


4

You said you are going to load the third-party content in an iframe, but will the third-party content be hosted from the same domain as your main content, or will it be served from a separate domain? If the third-party content is hosted on the same domain as your main page, then no, your approach is totally insecure. Content in an iframe has full scripting ...


4

The Linux Audit Framework supports syscall monitoring - I believe it is what you are looking for.


4

You can make a timeline First of all, they may be working on testing and rolling-out a fix. Before you go public, you may want to let them know your timeline and see if they respond. They may be more willing to communicate if they have an incentive to do so. You can be vague Your typical "black-hat" is not as bright as he wants to appear. As a rule, the ...


4

In addition to the excellent guidance from Rook and tylerl - are you certain you have the correct contact at the company? Large corporates can be useless at passing information internally, or even being aware of who to pass it to, so make sure you are sending the information to the correct team. Consider sending it to a wider audience at that company - ...


4

If you simply replace eval() with something like file_put_contents() in each de-obfuscation step you will be able to get the actual malicious code and be able to analyze it. Just make sure you don't output the results to the browser because at some point actual malicious code will be executed in the browser and your machine might get compromised. Write the ...


4

The colloquial term for that is honeypot. A honeypot system must be attractive for the attacker, but otherwise constrained so that it does not help the attacker in his nefarious schemes. This is a rather delicate balance. For instance, a honeypot to trap spammers must look as if it could serve as relay for tons of spam, but preferably not allow much spam (or ...


3

There are some security benefits to running the browser in a sandbox. If the browser gets compromised, then the sandbox can limit the damage. However, there are also serious usability implications of running your browser in a sandbox. For instance, say you want to download a document off the web and save it somewhere for later use. Nope, sorry, no can ...



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