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10

First, it's not a URL, it's a host name or domain name. The host name is one part of the URL. http://security.stackexchange.com/questions/92838/is-it-neccessary-the-website-certificate-must-have-site-url is a URL, and the host name is security.stackexchange.com. Next, yes, at least one host name in the certificate must match the exact host name used to ...


10

I do not know Chinese but by looking at qq.com I see that the login page is on HTTPS. This is just an example that the HTTPS pages may not be the front ones. You will find the same case in some "portal type" European sites (wp.pl being one example): the front page (with information) is on HTTP and any sensitive one (email for instance) is on HTTPS. To ...


5

site is only available in HTTPS HSTS in this case at least notifies that browser that the site will not be available in HTTP for the foreseeable future. Once the browser knows this (i.e. after the first visit) a downgrade attack like sslstrip will fail, because the browser will not connect with insecure HTTP to the site. The secure flag for cookies ...


5

How exactly is this protecting against a malicious DNS routing? Not at all. If an evil guy has a valid certificate (e.g. from a hacking a CA) and then manages to man-in-the-middle you, then your connection is hacked. I was expecting a challenge response using the public key of the server, but I cannot find it. In order to do this you would have ...


4

Such compromises already happened and DigiNotar is just on example. In effect the attacker could impersonate almost all certificates this way, because for most certificates it does not matter who signed it but only that it was signed by a CA trusted by the browser. There are few exceptions which are thus safer: Chrome and Firefox (and IE with EMET?) have ...


3

No, new root certificates are added on a regular basis. Microsoft have a Trusted Root Certificate programme enabling CAs to enroll. This happens with most products that handle certificate verification. For example, this is Mozilla's list where you can see that there are several added per year. For Microsoft's list you can simply check your Windows OS's ...


3

That should never happen. User is requesting your site via https://example.com. The user's browser will expect the server to provide a cert with hostname of example.com. Hacker can not MITM that as hacker will not have the example.com private key to sign a message and authenticate as example.com. User's browser will report an severe warning. If hacker ...


3

Yes the hostname on the cert must match the hostname portion of the url the cert is requested from. That is a requirement because there is an expectation that SSL not only secure the communication (encryption) but also ensure the user is connecting to the proper server (authentication). Without that requirement it would be trivial to spoof users with a ...


3

Encrypted key files do have some value, but generally the value is limited because the practicality of serving a 24/7 operation dictates that the key must be stored on the filesystem somewhere in unencrypted form. The alternative of the password being typed in by an administrator each time a server is restarted is terribly impractical and creates risk of ...


2

EDIT 2: No idea. Maybe they scored by the letter of the definition. Rather than by the spirit. Earlier musings (with sources) below. Because the "Confidentiality" scale in CVSS v2 seems to be about potential of disclosure of the server's file system. Super counter intuitive. But the mouse-over text reveals it all. This is what the mouse-over says for ...


2

What you describe is https with self-signed certificates, i.e. Setup a new server with SSH, it makes it's own keys. Setup a https server with a self-signed certificate. ssh to a new server and get a new fingerprint: "This is new, accept?" Connect to the new server with the browser. You get a warning but can tell he browser to add an ...


2

Let's look at how such a thing might play out: A classic example is the Dual-EC DRBG which employees a back-doored RNG to create a general attack against TLS. The other half of this attack beyond the vulnerable RNG is a mechanism for revealing to the attacker the state of the RNG at the time of use to allow the attacker to predict the remaining "random" ...


2

The compromise of a Root CA does not mean that all certificates signed by that trusted root are indeed compromised. Rather, it means that fraudulent certificates can be made for man-in-the-middle attacks and signed so they appear trusted in a browser. When you submit your Certificate Signing Request (CSR) to a Certification Authority (CA), they are ...


2

Why are there two paths? Were do they come from, where are they configured? A signature is created by using the public key of the issuers certificate. Two certificates can contain the same public key (typical after re-issuing a certificate) and this leads to alternative trust path if both of these CA certificates are included in the trust store. ...


2

1 - The "trust store" depends of you browser / operating system. For Firefox, it's inside firefox, for Chrome on windows, it's the trust store of your windows There is two path because ssllabs know two certificate that can be root. If your visitor have any of the two in their trust store, your certificate will be valid. 2 - Chrome may complain because if a ...


1

Instead of setting up multiple CAs, you can just tweak access settings in your Apache configuration. Look at Require directive: http://httpd.apache.org/docs/2.2/mod/core.html#require If you set any authentication requirement, then default Require level is implicitly set to "valid-user" (anyone that meets other requirements). But using Require, optionally ...


1

So are there actually two different legitimate versions of the VeriSign certificate which can be used to sign the same child certificate? Signing is done by the public key in the certificate. Both certificates have the same public key, so both can be used to verify the signature. The difference is that 18:da:d1:9e:26:7d:... is issued by itself while ...


1

The process of establishing a full trust chain between two system using TLS is the following: 1/ Create or obtain the root CA X509 certificate. 2/ Obtain all intermediate signing authorities. 3/ generate a leaf X509 certificate and have it signed by the authority immediately higher in the trust chain (either an intermediate CA or the root CA if you're using ...


1

SSL Labs uses the Mozilla trust store What is this "trust store" mentioned? Is it in my browser? On the server I'm testing? On the ssllabs server? The trust store is on the SSL Labs server. They use the Mozilla trust store. Details below. Why are there two paths? Where do they come from, where are they configured? Because both the ...


1

Well the issue here is that Microsoft should have updated their Root Certificate Program member list PDF document and notified their corporate and government customers at the very least, which they haven't. Also, SilverlightFox is wrong: you cannot "simply check your Windows OS's certificate store for root certs.", as this only provides a list of currently ...


1

The privacy of browsing information depends on vulnerability of SSL that your service provider use. If a website using a vulnerable protocol (like as SSLV3 that vulnerable to POODLE attack) or weak signature algorithm (like as Diffie-Hellman (DH) key exchange), absolutely your information is in danger. but for example if a website using TLSV1.2 with ...


1

There are some classes of PRNG weaknesses which require the attacker to obtain multiple numbers in order to predict the next number in the sequence. Using two PRNGs would compartmentalise the risk, in the event the "public" chain can be predicted, the "secret" numbers may still be unpredictable. Honestly I wouldn't consider it that significant but it could ...


1

You can do it in Google Chrome with chrome://net-internals/#hsts : In that screen you can consult the pinning state of a website (HSTS, HPKP and preloaded) but you can add certificate pinning for any domains too : In the Add domain section, you can specify for any domain : If you want to force HSTS If you want to pin some certificate : you need to ...


1

Yes, your ISP has records of your attempt to visit the original page. That request left your browser, went through the ISP and to Facebook, which sent back a response of a 503 error, which your ISP also has records of.


1

Key Usage error The key usage field shows exclamation mark because this field is marked as critical. This is not an error. why is it showing "Thumbprint alogrithm as "sha1" Beacuse the certificate thumbprint (the field below it) is created using SHA1.


1

You are absolutely correct, when there is no valid HTTP inside of the SSL encryption, a decrypted flow will not work through a SSL intercept proxy. One of the things you need to do before implementing SSL intercept is that you need to identify SSL based applications that are not http-based to prevent denied access (handling through Whitelist). I can only ...


1

Digitally-signed struct for RSA signing And what's this digitally-signed structure? It's defined in TLS 1.1's Section 4.7. Cryptographic Attributes: In RSA signing, a 36-byte structure of two hashes (one SHA and one MD5) is signed (encrypted with the private key). It is encoded with PKCS #1 block type 1, as described in [PKCS1A]. MD5 hash in ...


1

How can I add certificate pinning for other domains to my web browser (e.g. FireFox)? I don't think it's got a GUI in Firefox. For Chrome see Tom's answer. Is there a reason why there is no option to "Pin this certificate to this URI" when viewing the details of a certificate in a web browser? Yes. It's support hell when it's time for a key ...



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