Tag Info

New answers tagged

3

The Tor client ships with a hard-coded list of "directory authorities": servers that maintain a list of known Tor nodes. On startup and at intervals afterwards, your client connects to them to get a copy of this list. Once your client has the list, it builds the circuits itself, selecting entry, middle, and exit nodes more or less at random. From a ...


1

Network traffic destined to the .onion address will only leave the Tor network inside the Facebook datacenter. Therefore outsiders on hostile networks (e.g. countries with strong censorship, corporate LANs with strict social media policies, malicious Tor exit node) will only see Tor-related traffic going in/out from your computer. Keep in mind this does ...


1

When you browse to a .onion website the web server sees the connection coming from the hidden service operator's Tor client. It is common (though not the most secure configuration) that this instance of the Tor software is running on the same machine as the web server, in which case the web server's access logs will show all traffic originating from ...


2

To a large extent, yes, you will lose your anonymity. Github (and anyone monitoring Github) will be able to connect your email address to your IP address. A key element of anonymity (or more technically, pseudonymity) is keeping your separate identities separate. Your Hushmail account accessed over Tor is one identity, while everything you do through ...


1

Yes. If you use an account on Tor and also use the same account not on Tor, your ownership of the account can be traced via the use not on Tor. If you link two accounts (e.g. by listing an email from Tor on a non-Tor account), someone could potentially find that link and then trace the non-Tor account. This is one of many reasons "use Tor" isn't enough to ...


11

Here is what using Tor to access an ordinary, non-onion facebook URL looks like: You -> Tor... -> facebook.com Now both of those links (from you to Tor and from Tor to facebook.com) happen on the open internet, so an attacker might watch packets flowing across those links like this: You -> (attacker) -> Tor... -> (attacker) -> ...


0

When creating Windows 7 firewall rules for Tor, creating rules for the unzip'd Tor software on your desktop may not work. This is because the Windows firewall doesn't work well with pathnames such as "%APPDATA%", etc, that end up in the pathname for rules when allowing the tor.exe client. So if you've got Tor unzip'd on your desktop and "any any" rules for ...


10

Visiting the .onion address never leaves the Tor network. Going to facebook.com over Tor exits the network and goes over the clear-net. That clear-net hop allows for an active attacker to get into your traffic. Now, your Facebook traffic is probably SSLed, right? If so, it doesn't matter much, but there's certainly more risk than not exiting the network ...


0

Like cpast mentioned Tor does not guarantee anonymity if large portion of the network by capacity (not by number of relays) is controlled by colluding advesaries. This is because one relay at 100 MB/sec capacity is effectivly is eqivalant to 100 relays at 1 MB/sec capacity. So it is the colluding adversaries's total employed data capacity to total capacity ...


5

It doesn't guarantee anonymity if enough of the network is controlled by a single adversary. There's no general way you can do so; if your whole connection goes entirely through adversary-run computers, your adversary is going to be able to track it, no matter what system you're using. What Tor does is make it really, really, really hard for an adversary to ...



Top 50 recent answers are included