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5

It may be your English skills, but TOR does not need a justification. TOR was invented by the U.S. Naval Research Labs and the U.S. DARPA (see Wikipedia History) as a research project. However though part of the U.S. Military, they publicly released the concept and its code, then a non-profit (the TOR Project) continued to develop and expand it. TOR has ...


0

TOR uses a set of proxies, relays and bridges to mask IP addresses. It also encrypts the connections between each relay with a 128 bit encryption, so it can be decent if I set myself to be a relay, for tor it would encrypt the ports it uses. But it has to be used securely to be secure. Scripts that can decipher or decrypt live incoming traffic could just ...


1

It depends on what you're trying to defend against. If you're trying to prevent a site operator from identifying who you as a user are, multiple VPNs won't gain you anything. The operator will see the traffic as coming from the endpoint of the final VPN regardless of how many there are in the chain. You're still vulnerable to being identified through ...


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Not really. Your question is about security and privacy of your data in transit, but you don't trust the endpoints. You can secure the route all you want, but it's difficult to force all applications to use it, especially those that compromise you from the other end of the VPN.


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Another approach or approaches that you can take to try to solve this problem is the idea of a semi-fragile signature. A semi-fragile signature is a digital signature which can be verified even when the data undergoes a limited set of transformations. I developed the concept originally (I called it a robust signature) in context of limiting the set of ...


1

It sounds like what you really are looking for is a zero knowledge proof (or several zkps). You want to prove that (1) data belongs to a given class (general contents) and (2) that the data is within some limits (upper/lower bounds). Since you also want to transmit the data through the system, you'll need to bind the proof to the data in such a way that ...


0

When your system makes DNS requests without the anonymisation network you are normally using an eavesdropper is able to predict which sites you are visiting. Assume you want to visit https://security.stackexchange.com/. Your browser makes a DNS request and sends it to your anonymisation network, which in turn requests the site. So the eavesdropper has an ...


1

DNSSEC does not protect against eavesdropping, in this respect it only signs the response so the client knows it has not been spoofed: It is a set of extensions to DNS which provide to DNS clients (resolvers) origin authentication of DNS data, authenticated denial of existence, and data integrity, but not availability or confidentiality. Emphasis ...


0

Per xander and Goblinlord's comments, let's go over some of the technologies you mention. VPN (virtual private network) solutions are used to create secure network connections over the public Internet. If you have more than one office location, or you have people working remotely from home or on the road, you use a VPN to enable secure communications ...


0

No and No to both of your questions. In reference to your first question google TOR DNS leak just as an example. While this is simply an example a good question to pose to yourself is "how secure is acceptable?" In reference to your second question, in this situation you would simply moving one end-point of the encrypted traffic from your computer to a ...


0

If you do DNS over your local unencrypted network, a third party could see what names you were looking up and might be able to glean some information out of those lookups. If you're a deep-cover CIA operative somewhere and they can see that you're going to super-sekret-email.cia.gov, well, even without that traffic you might be in trouble. There's also a ...


1

In that case the connection between anonymizer and webserver would be just as unencrypted as the connection between exit node and webserver. It would still be possible to eavesdrop on it. All you get from this is that you get an additional layer in your onion circuit (the outer layer is the https connection between you and the anonymizer) and that you shift ...


-3

You should use something like that: https://www.eff.org/https-everywhere It's created in colloboration with Tor developers, so you can rely on that if you already decided to trust Tor itself. Edited: My bad. Yes, SSL Everywhere addon won't provide you secure connection in case the target website doesn't support SSL at all, thanks to raz for pointing this ...


0

Many application aware firewalls and proxies can detect Tor and alert or block on it on their own. Also, you could implement Bro-IDS with Critical Stack Intel and use their updated tor exit node list to alert or report on. https://intel.criticalstack.com/


1

From Detecting TOR Communication in Network Traffic: A successful method for detecting Tor traffic is to instead utilize statistical analysis of the communication protocol in order to tell different SSL implementations apart. One of the very few tools that has support for protocol identification via statistical analysis is CapLoader. Clearly, this is a ...


2

Bonding two channels to the same AP is done. But you want to take it one big step further. You could perhaps do something of the kind using two wireless cards, two separate ESSIDs and some fancy footwork at kernel level (not all OSes would be able to do that), using bonding; or, even more complicated, by using two WiFi chips on a card that would simulate a ...


2

The ability to deanonymize using this method involves correlation among other traffic by your IP. The more traffic available to correlate, the better chances of deanonymizing. I believe the use of "common locations" denotes an AS containing many other popular sites, maybe to include gaming servers, StackExchange web servers, CDNs, etc. Perhaps an ...



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