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2

It depends on what you consider a "secure computer". Security is typically defined by the CIA triad of confidentiality, integrity, and availability. Once you allow physical access to a device, you lose the ability to maintain availability. It's just too hard to make something indestructible against a motivated and funded adversary when they have physical ...


4

The fundamental answer is the market doesn't really want to pay for general purpose computers that are secure against physical attacks. You propose making tradeoffs, and those tradeoffs involve engineering costs and operational costs which only a small number of buyers care about. Some computer systems try to make these tradeoffs (for example, the Xbox) ...


2

I think some of the things you propose are doable but conflict with expected usability, flexibility or freedom of use. Others take ideas from the software world and try to adapt it to the hardware, but fail to address the problems we already have at the software side. But some of the ideas are already used in practice. Just a few examples: Seal the ...


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There are three problems. By definition, someone having physical access over a system already breaks security. Hardware is made to be compatible Hardware has much more and much more severe attack vectors My question is, is that just hardware manufacturers suck at security, or is there an intrinsic reason that is true. Can you create systems that ...


2

I think you are certainly right, the verifier knows your TPM is trusted. In the DAA case the verifier cannot map TPM to user though. In AIK certificate enrollment, the Certificate Authority may well be the same entity that verifies the AIK certificate. Whereas in DAA, there is no Certificate Authority involved. There is an issuer which works with a TPM ...



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