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6

Matthew Garrett has some nice blog posts on UEFI Secure Boot. Concerning your question he writes: Anyone can pay $99 and get their binaries signed. So why won't malware authors just do that? For starters, you'll need to provide some form of plausible ID for Verisign to authenticate you and hand over access. So, sure, you provide some sort of fake ID. ...


5

This depends what you mean by “the overall concept of secure boot”. Pretty much all secure boot systems have several components, starting with one in ROM and ending with an operating system or even programs within that operating system. A typical boot chain is ROM → OEM bootloader → OS bootloader → OS kernel → OS startup programs. A typical secure boot ...


4

The attack you describe sounds more like a "diamond heist" attack of sorts (a bit elaborate for the everyday criminal). Before I address UEFI, I wanted to answer if that is feasable. No, not really. If we are talking about a server running a VM, the end user may not notice a performance issue (given enough physical resources) but more than likely the ...


4

Real security enhancements are created if you are buying for a commercial or governmental enterprise but at a cost related to supportability. For the majority of home users who want nothing more than a Microsoft desktop and never modify their purchased system it will also provided added security. For the home user that wants to dual boot (a very small ...


3

Secure Boot for PCs is inflexible and leaves you with few options if your system is somehow broken. It is also not designed to scale in an environment with multiple stakeholders - say your company wants to use Secure Boot to ensure not only a proper windows installation but also a set of certain policy-enforcing tools. Not possible out of the box. Trusted ...


3

You are mixing up two technologies here it seems. First, there is UEFI and its Secure Boot feature. Secure Boot can be used to assure that your boot loader and your OS kernel are not tampered with. In order to do so, your boot loader and kernel need to be signed digitally and your UEFI configuration must contain the certificates/signatures needed to verify ...


2

This is using Trusted Platform Module to defeat the Evil Maid Attack. In short this is to insure that your bootloader hasn't been tampered with, which could undermine an encrypted file system.


2

After conducting extensive research on the Bitlocker platform, I believe I can answer my own question. Key reference: Bitlocker Drive Encryption Technical Overview In our default setup (at least on MS Surface Pro 3), Bitlocker, UEFI and Secure Boot are on. There is TPM 2.0 enabled. The UEFI is not password protected, and the boot order allows USB before ...


2

Physical access is always a very risky thing. While I don't now of any security flaws right now that will give you immediate access there are a lot of other things that you can do, eg. using a USB keylogger to intercept the user's password when he uses the machine the next time. There have been attacks using PCI cards utilizing direct memory access ...


2

UEFI secure boot ensures that the UEFI firmware loads and executes only signed UEFI applications (including bootloaders) and drivers. So an attempt to modify them by introducing a malware would be detected and rejected. A vulnerability or malware (including rootkits) could possibly be also signed in the loaded code or the components loaded next. Can a ...


1

First, there's a terminology issue when talking about this stuff. Strictly, 'BIOS' and 'UEFI' are different programming interfaces for the firmware present on PC motherboards. However, in a PC context, 'BIOS' is often used to refer to the firmware irrespective of its API -- that is, "UEFI BIOSes" should strictly read "UEFI firmwares". (Just to be clear: ...


1

Software cannot protect against physical attacks. Security requires a layered approach. Most cases have the ability to put on a physical lock. More secure systems cases can also hide the cable connections and prevent changing keyboards, or other peripheral connections. The BIOS/boot password is only one part of a greater security plan for a system. It's ...


1

I recommend locking down GRUB and taking away access to the GRUB shell. GRUB manual: Authentication and authorisation (Archived here.) By default, the boot loader interface is accessible to anyone with physical access to the console: anyone can select and edit any menu entry, and anyone can get direct access to a GRUB shell prompt. For most systems, ...



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