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To properly expand your thesis, you should probably read the rest of the article you posted. Under "Android and Google Service Mitigations" it explains the current posture of Google to deal with these threats. While the best solution is naturally to patch the OS at the lowest level the bug exists, it is effective enough to patch the apps in userland that ...


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This doesn't directly answer your question (it was answered adequately above), but given your paranoia the one thing you do need to be wary of is using public terminals provided by a vendor, such as in a library, internet cafe, employer, school, etc. If they are providing you the endpoint/device, they can manipulate the certificate chain and intercept all ...


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Disable wireless administration: Change the setting that allows administration of the router through a wireless connection to off . This means that you need to connect with a LAN cable for administration. This disables any wireless hacking into the router.


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Generally speaking†, one cannot intercept HTTPS communications. However, a hot-spot provider can do the following: See the hostnames you want to connect to from your DNS requests See the IP addresses you connect to If you type in say http://yourbank.com, hoping for a redirect to https://yourbank.com, the hot-spot owner can intercept that and ...


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You cannot. Not all chipsets/wifi drivers support monitor mode. Broadcom is know for lacking in open source drivers functionality support. It is already public knowledge the RPi 3 current driver implementation does not support monitor mode. PSA: The Raspberry Pi 3's embedded WiFi card does not support promiscuous mode. If you are buying a replacement, do ...


1

Wifi (even with password) is usually set up as being security equivalent to an open wired network (plug in to network, you are presumed to supposed to be on it). All communcation by any party on the network is fully visible. Security can be applied on top of the unsecured communication, but an open wired network has next to no security built-in (other than ...


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Steffen is right in saying that the hacker cannot fake the remote server certificate over HTTPS and therefore cannot intercept the encrypted data exchange without the user getting invalid certificate alert warnings. However: This does not prevent SSL Stripping attacks. This does not prevent sessions fixation attacks over HTTP (the difficult bit is ...


0

The certificate can indeed be faked, however the browser will throw an error. However let´s is suppose a rogue router/DNS or an attacker are listening in http/DNS to google.com and redirect you to a site with a slight typo. You are talking with a friend, or chatting up the server, and you only notice too late after typing in the password, that it is a ...


4

Since the hacker now controls any communication between the victim and the outside world, he could now reuse the real certificate issued by GeoTrust Global CA for mail.google.com domain when I access the HTTP server at 192.168.1.50. No he can't. To identify yourself with a certificate (which needs to be done to fake the server) you need to have access ...


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Someone who has administrative access to the network you are connecting to can: View the IP address and domain names of the site you're connecting to (based on DNS query and/or SNI in TLS) and which email provider you're using, irrespective of encryption. You can prevent this by using encrypted third party DNS (e.g. DNSCurve to OpenDNS). The location of ...


-3

Any unencrypted data sent over Wi-Fi is potentially vulnerable. Some questions: Is the connection encrypted? (look for WEP, WPA, or WPA2 in the connection details) Are you using a virtual private network or IPsec? Are the sites you are visiting using encrypted connections? (in particular, look for a lock icon in the URL bar) If you answered yes to any of ...


0

First of all, remember that in most countries (if not all) accessing protected Wi-Fi networks without authorization is illegal. There are techniques you can use to do this, but I'm not going to describe them because it seems that you might use them to break the law, even if not knowingly. Learning ethical hacking is great, but you need to keep it ethical and ...


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You could do it all more "manually" : Set your wlan0 interface down : ip link set wlan0 down. Change the mode from managed to monitor : iw dev wlan0 set type monitor. And bring back up : ip link set wlan0 up. And you can check the result with a simple iw dev. That shouldn't change anything on your other interface wlan1, at least it does it for me ...


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As others have answered, MAC filtering and SSID hiding don't help against an active attacker. But, they may be worthwhile for some degree of protection from untrusted devices used by mostly-trusted people. I'll explain with a hypothetical situation: Say you have a router at home (or in a business) configured for a separate "guest network". Many home ...


1

While the duplicate that people have linked to does cover most of the story, there's actually a way to make MAC filtering work: enable client isolation. Client isolation prevents individual WiFi clients from communicating with each other, effectively segregating their traffic. Since in order to know the MAC of a legitimate client you'd need to see traffic ...


1

As you said, MAC filtering provides an extra layer of security, as the potential attacker would need to spoof his MAC address (something we would do anyways if he doesn't want to get caught). To provide a good security for your Wi-Fi you should have MAC filtering enabled (with a white list), DHCP disabled with fixed IP for your devices (if possible), WPS ...


1

MAC addresses are only relevant to the nearest hop. So you can only spoof a MAC address within a LAN. That means that someone wanting to get around any restrictions needs to connect to your network, or to a network which is directly connected to your network. i.e. the attack surface is reduced. Like port firewalling, MAC filtering is a great way to cut down ...


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A MAC address filter provides no real security, but it does provide a false sense of security. It should therefore be considered harmful. If you need to limit access to certain devices, use WPA2. If a single pre-shared key is not sufficient for your purposes, it's not that hard (ok, ok, famous last words) to run a RADIUS server and use enterprise auth. I ...


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You appear to have answered your own question. An advanced user can spoof a MAC address, but non-advanced users cannot. MAC address filtering provides limited access to those who do not have the skill to spoof a MAC address.


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MAC filtering doesn't provide an high security. An attacker can simply see which devices (and their relative MACs) are connected to your network, and spoof one of theese MACs. When he changes it to his machine, he can connects to your network without any problem. In conclusion, MAC address filtering doesn't increase your security.


1

Beacons: Beacon frame is one of the management frames in IEEE 802.11 based WLANs. It contains all the information about the network. Beacon frames are transmitted periodically to announce the presence of a wireless LAN. Your problem may because one of the following: Your wireless adapter is not on monitor mode Your wireless adapter doesn't support packet ...


1

If you give a guest a wifi password, they can share that password though obviously you could politely ask them to not share it. The only way to prevent that is never share one global wifi password with guests you do not trust. The best practice would be to maintain your home wifi network (secret password, never give to others) and a shareable guest network ...


0

Actually, you have two options: guest network - fast and dumb solution. It can be reconfigured as many times as you need, but it will require you to re-provide the credentials. But it can be an "isolation layer" that will properly separate your Wireless devices from aguest ones. MAC access control - a little elaborating, but secure solution if applied ...


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Here are some options: You could buy an additional cheap router, and turn it off and on whenever needed. You could add Network Access Control, you could configure your existing router to ONLY accept your devices' MAC addresses. When a guest comes in, add his MAC to the list, ignoring all unknown MAC addresses, and remove their MAC when they leave. Or you ...


0

What you want is an AP that offers some sort of Guest Network functionality. This would allow you to give out the wifi password, guests can then access the internet (since they probably have no business talking to your devices directly) and then every few days you can reset that password to the detriment of anyone else who might know it at that moment. ...


7

Since according to your description all systems in your network are affected and independent from the operating system, the chances are high that your router is compromised and the DNS settings are changed. This way most outgoing traffic can be controlled by the attacker which leads to all these redirects to ads. This type of compromise is not uncommon as ...


0

But what if I logged into a service on my private home network, never cleared the session and want to continue using the service from public wifi after I leave the house? No it wouldn't make much of a difference. What makes a difference though, is making sure the site you are visiting uses HTTPS and that your email client (if you use desktop or mobile ...


2

If the site you are visiting uses HTTPS for the entire site (not just the login page) and you check that it actually is using HTTPS, with a valid certificate (e.g., no warnings about a bad certificate) and it is the URL you want to go to, then you are safe. (Except against extremely strong adversaries like governments who have the ability to coerce ...


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The security of the network is proportional to the behaviours/actions/endpoints that can be executed in that context. From that definition, a public WiFi with an indeterminate number of people means on the whole it is reasonably insecure. With that in mind, most admins will compartmentalise large networks into smaller ones to reduce risk of compromise.



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