217 reputation
17
bio website
location
age
visits member for 1 year, 8 months
seen 9 hours ago

Mar
11
revised Where does a Hyper-V guest get its entropy when generating a certificate authority key pair?
fixed title
Mar
11
comment Where does a Hyper-V guest get its entropy when generating a certificate authority key pair?
Also, do you have a source supporting the general availability of RdRand to Hyper-V guests? Ostensibly, not all VMWare guests have access to RdRand. It seems like the same might be true for Hyper-V.
Mar
11
comment Where does a Hyper-V guest get its entropy when generating a certificate authority key pair?
Do you have a source for your point (4)? The link you provided does not support it.
Mar
10
awarded  Nice Question
Feb
22
awarded  Yearling
Feb
14
asked Where does a Hyper-V guest get its entropy when generating a certificate authority key pair?
Apr
10
awarded  Excavator
Apr
10
revised How does a client authenticate the domain controller
fixed malformed numbered list; spelling/grammar fixes
Apr
10
suggested suggested edit on How does a client authenticate the domain controller
Mar
27
accepted When taking ownership of a TPM in Windows 7, how is the SRK derived from the password?
Mar
17
accepted Is there a reliable way to simulate “Evil Maid Attack” boot path tampering when using bitlocker?
Mar
17
answered Is there a reliable way to simulate “Evil Maid Attack” boot path tampering when using bitlocker?
Mar
17
comment When taking ownership of a TPM in Windows 7, how is the SRK derived from the password?
Thanks for the great answer. I'm not grokking your last paragraph, though. What do you mean by "internal encryption"?
Mar
17
asked When taking ownership of a TPM in Windows 7, how is the SRK derived from the password?
Feb
14
comment Is there a reliable way to simulate “Evil Maid Attack” boot path tampering when using bitlocker?
'performing the attack' would work just as well for my purposes. I've been hunting for an image of the "specially prepared USB drive" apparently used in the article, without success. I'd like to attempt the attack in the article, but without an image that is pretty tough.
Feb
14
comment Is there a reliable way to simulate “Evil Maid Attack” boot path tampering when using bitlocker?
As we established in the question's comments, this doesn't answer my actual question. The paper is on point, and is a decent survey of plausible attack strategies. However, it only confirms what I already understood: Boot path tampering is detectable by the user when using Bitlocker with "PIN + TPM". My original question of how to simulate such boot path tampering for testing, however, remains.
Feb
14
awarded  Commentator
Feb
14
comment Is there a reliable way to simulate “Evil Maid Attack” boot path tampering when using bitlocker?
@BobWatson I think you've found the root of our miscommunication. Thanks for that. Indeed, I am specifically interested in "'Evil Maid Attack' boot path tampering" (à la the question's title) not every possible flavor of 'Evil Maid Attack' of which there are many, as you have commented.
Feb
13
comment Is there a reliable way to simulate “Evil Maid Attack” boot path tampering when using bitlocker?
"You're asking to protect yourself in the case where you're leaving your machine unattended." I didn't ask that. With respect, I'm not really interested in opinions about the likelihood of surreptitious replacement of my motherboard. I'm actually interested in an answer to my original question.
Feb
13
comment Is there a reliable way to simulate “Evil Maid Attack” boot path tampering when using bitlocker?
Thanks @BobWatson. I have seen that argument advanced before. It seems to lump all forms of physical access threats together. In particular, it dismisses the idea of protecting against boot path tampering because a hardware key logger could be installed. Personally, I don't follow that argument: I can disassemble my laptop and fairly confidently rule out the existence of a hardware key logger, so why shouldn't I use a TPM to rule out the existence of a boot-path key logger?