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revised Open-source penetration-test automation
deleted 5 characters in body
7h
revised Open-source penetration-test automation
deleted 229 characters in body
Jun
15
comment Android wear, Tizen Encryption
@ pqsk : Thank you. Here also is a better analysis on Android Wear -- labs.mwrinfosecurity.com/blog/2015/05/22/…
Jun
15
comment Android wear, Tizen Encryption
To roughly summarize, Wear and Tizen don't do any full-disk encryption, so encryption must be provided by the app, preferably at the transport layer to a TLS-based service (and then stored securely on a server). Three Wear devices can currently be rooted, and as such, strace, gdb, and other memory-dumping, hooking, and software/process tracing/debugging tools can be leveraged to read data at the system-call, kernel, or other userspace layer. Libraries can be shimmed and methods/functions can be clobbered.
Jun
15
comment Android wear, Tizen Encryption
Well, I can't answer until someone reopens this question but check out these resources in the meantime -- conference.hitb.org/hitbsecconf2015ams/materials/Whitepapers/… -- conference.hitb.org/hitbsecconf2015ams/materials/…
Jun
15
comment Android wear, Tizen Encryption
@ pqsk : Ok great, that's what I thought but glad you clarified. Now on to an answer!
Jun
15
comment Automated tools for applying formal methods to verify security policy in existing software
@ Steve DL: added clarity, thank you for the feedback
Jun
15
revised Automated tools for applying formal methods to verify security policy in existing software
added 136 characters in body
Jun
15
comment Automated tools for applying formal methods to verify security policy in existing software
there is also langsec.org
Jun
14
comment Android wear, Tizen Encryption
Someone please do a writeup of this article -- androidguys.com/2015/06/14/…
Jun
14
answered Automated tools for applying formal methods to verify security policy in existing software
Jun
13
comment IPhone iOS 8.3 encryption security against physical access
The iPhone 4 can't run iOS 8, only iOS 7. Is this rhetorical or do you mean the iPhone 4S? Let me change this around -- let's assume iPhone 5S, which contains the Secure Enclave. In this case, some data (non-iOS-dpapi) is recoverable except when the phone is off --or-- if the phone has just booted and no PIN/passphrase has yet been entered. An MDM certificate on the phone could also be used for full data recovery. More info here -- darthnull.org/2014/10/06/ios-encryption
Jun
12
answered find if 0-day flash bug was exploited (on a particular machine)
Jun
4
comment explanation of an nmap behaviour
My first guess is that the host is not ICMP reachable, nor does it run TCP ports 80 or 443, thus the host is skipped due to a lack of the -Pn flag. My second guess is that the parallelism and/or scan-delay defaults of T3 timing aren't sufficiently picking up the port, so try -T2 --scan-delay 1s, -T1, or even -T0
May
22
comment Any way to circumvent a 'filtered' response on NMap?
Repeat question -- security.stackexchange.com/questions/53104/…
May
20
comment Resources on security risks of NFC
Also see this question -- security.stackexchange.com/q/66590/140
May
20
comment How secure is NFC on mobile devices?
Also see -- security.stackexchange.com/q/66590/140
May
18
revised Securing Data at Rest in Android
added 96 characters in body
May
17
comment How to detect Meterpreter and similar malware?
Actually it appears that Avast, BitDefender, and BullGuard are the only three that can reliably detect Meterpreter. In particular, McAfee and TrendMicro will not even catch a Meterpreter which has not been obfuscated at all! What the heck!
May
17
answered Threat modelling tools and alternative threats