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Jan
15
revised How can I protect myself from this kind of clipboard abuse?
added 11 characters in body
Jan
15
awarded  Necromancer
Jan
15
comment How can I protect myself from this kind of clipboard abuse?
xclip sets the X "primary" selection, not cut buffers. Terminal emulators only query the cut buffers (which are X11 properties on the root window) if at all (xterm and rxvt do, but vte based-ones don't) when there's no primary (or clipboard depending on the pasting function) selection. Cut buffers are things of the past that are hardly used anymore nowadays.
Jan
15
comment How can I protect myself from this kind of clipboard abuse?
It's the tty line discipline's role (software in the kernel) to convert CR to LF on input when required. xterm and most if not all other X11 terminal emulators actually do convert LF to CR in pastes as the return/enter key sends CR, not LF.
Jan
15
revised How can I protect myself from this kind of clipboard abuse?
bash and zsh now have that bracketed-paste mode support built-in
Jun
3
revised How can I protect myself from this kind of clipboard abuse?
added 791 characters in body
May
11
revised How can I protect myself from this kind of clipboard abuse?
added 14 characters in body
May
11
revised How can I protect myself from this kind of clipboard abuse?
added 30 characters in body
Mar
13
awarded  Citizen Patrol
Jan
14
comment Why Bash Shellshock vulnerability cannot be detected at webservers in advance?
attacks using the HTTP header vector are easily detectable. I posted snort signatures on 2014-09-20, 4 days before disclosure like alert tcp any any -> any $HTTP_PORTS (msg:"CVE-2014-6271 bashdoor exploit attempt over HTTP"; flow: to_server,established; content:"() {"; http_header; fast_pattern:only; classtype:web-application-attack; sid:1000000; rev:1;) there's no general pattern for successful attacks, though there can be for specific ones (like the ones that cause a wget to be run on the target).
Jan
2
revised How can I protect myself from this kind of clipboard abuse?
edited body
Dec
11
awarded  Critic
Oct
15
comment SSL3 “POODLE” Vulnerability
What about the forced/unsafe out of protocol downgrade to SSLv3? What are the software affected by that?
Oct
7
comment Shellshocking Webservers, does anyone know of an attack-vector other than Headers?
@thatguyfromoverthere, I'd agree it probably should, but apache doesn't (at least not in the versions I tried). That first line can contain anything, the first word is the method, the second the path and the rest, if any the protocol (SERVER_PROTOCOL defaults to HTTP/0.9 when not provided probably for compatibility with servers from the early 90s).
Oct
3
awarded  Yearling
Oct
3
comment When Shellshock was introduced, how bad was it **then**?
As was found later, the FIE was added in 1.03 in August 1989, so before the web.
Oct
3
comment Set-uid script wrappers, `system(3)` shellshock and Bash Function Import from Environment
When PATH is unset, it defaults to something, and that something depends on who does the path look up, and for GNU libc's exec*p for instance, it's :/bin:/usr/bin, so it looks for executables in the current directory first. Luckily, most shells set PATH on startup to something saner if it's not set. But if /path/to/script.sh's interpreter is not one of those, you're screwed. An empty environment can also be unsafe.
Oct
3
comment Shellshock plus sudo/su environment whitelist bypass - big problem?
D'oh. I stand corrected. How can they? That was one of the things the Bourne shell used to be bashed on in the 90s. That posh was modified (as it's based on pdksh which doesn't to something as silly) to do that doesn't make sense either.
Oct
3
revised Why “() { :;};”?
in practice, bash replaced the = with a space (that doesn't make much of a difference though).
Oct
3
comment When Shellshock was introduced, how bad was it **then**?
Some Unices still support setuid scripts. telnet, rlogin or rsh could and still can get you to a restricted command (and TERM is passed): the login shell of the target user. It's not unheard of to have public services exposed that way (even without authentication)