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visits member for 1 year, 10 months
seen Jul 20 at 17:08

Oct
27
awarded  Good Answer
Jul
20
answered Want to build a password manager using OpenPGP.js
Jul
14
awarded  Good Answer
Jul
12
answered password generating algorithm
Jul
11
comment Is “the oft-cited XKCD scheme […] no longer good advice”?
Excellent question! My (possibly erroneous) thinking at the time was that I also wanted passphrases to be a minimum length. I wanted to make sure that if someone used a three word passphrase, it would exceed a minimum of 12 characters in length. I note that S/Key also allows 1, 2, and 3 letter words.
Jul
11
awarded  Nice Answer
Jul
10
answered Is “the oft-cited XKCD scheme […] no longer good advice”?
Jun
26
answered Aren't password managers still incredibly risky?
Apr
24
comment Why use PBKDF2 over multiple iterations of a another cryptographic hash function?
There really are no compelling reasons to prefer PBKDF2 over bcrypt and this is almost a matter of taste. (scrypt, however, does have real advantages over both). PBKDF2 is more modular in that (a) you can choose your PRF, and (b) it can also be asked to produce different output sizes. (Though is can screw that up, so maybe that isn't a virtue.)
Apr
24
comment True?: “Nearly all encrypted passwords are stored with the last character in clear text”?
I never meant to suggest that newer system encrypt the salt. Salt was (and is) unencrypted, but I was speculating about where two unencrypted bytes might be that is the source of the confusion.
Apr
24
awarded  Commentator
Apr
24
comment How do password suites store and encrypt their metadata and prevent attacks based on that knowledge?
Ah I answered the wrong question. If I (finally) understand, then you are really asking about known plaintext attacks. That is, if the attacker knows what some portion of the decrypted data should look like, then does that give the attacker an advantage. Short answer: Not since Enigma. Modern crypto systems are designed to resist known plaintext attacks.
Apr
20
comment Keepass Dictionary Attack Protection Strategy
I'm not sure of the history, but the "home grown" aspect of it may be because the predecessor of KeePass may have predated PBKDF2. @TheWolf is wrong to say that AES each round could be substituted by k_{i+1} = SHA256(salt + k_i). SHA-2 is not a pseudo-random function (PRF). So use HMAC in here if you don't want to use AES.
Apr
20
answered Keepass Dictionary Attack Protection Strategy
Apr
18
answered How do password suites store and encrypt their metadata and prevent attacks based on that knowledge?
Mar
26
answered True?: “Nearly all encrypted passwords are stored with the last character in clear text”?
Mar
22
answered Why use PBKDF2 over multiple iterations of a another cryptographic hash function?
Mar
17
awarded  Nice Answer
Jan
29
awarded  Yearling
Dec
9
answered At what length does a password stop making sense?