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Mar 26 |
awarded | Revival |
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Mar 7 |
awarded | Enthusiast |
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Feb 24 |
awarded | Enlightened |
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Feb 22 |
awarded | Enlightened |
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Feb 22 |
awarded | Nice Answer |
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Feb 21 |
comment |
How can I tunnel through an SSH server for HTTP(s) requests? Have a look at wiki.vpslink.com/Instant_SOCKS_Proxy_over_SSH - what you're after is achievable with a SOCKS proxy, the only caveat being that client software (IE/Firefox/Chrome in the case of HTTP/HTTPS) needs to support it and be configured to use it. |
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Feb 20 |
reviewed | No Action Needed What is the correct way to implement anti-CSRF form tokens? |
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Feb 20 |
reviewed | No Action Needed What is the correct way to implement anti-CSRF form tokens? |
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Feb 20 |
comment |
Cracking MS-CACHE v2 hashes using GPU Have a look at my update above - it contains the link for MSCash2 - openwall.info/wiki/john/MSCash2 and a couple of other things I found out. |
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Feb 20 |
awarded | Nice Answer |
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Feb 19 |
awarded | Good Answer |
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Feb 17 |
comment |
Is this SSO design secure? We're getting way off topic; maybe worth a second question if you want detailed answers. The quick answer is: 'DNS Poisononing is easier than you think, public wifi plus a cheap device - and cache entries can outlive your connection to a compromised network.' |
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Feb 17 |
comment |
Cracking MS-CACHE v2 hashes using GPU I've added a section detailing what I found of MSCache2 - as compared to openwall.info/wiki/john/MSCash I don't think it's anywhere near as attackable. You'd have to go in with some prior knowledge of some description. |
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Feb 17 |
revised |
Cracking MS-CACHE v2 hashes using GPU added 925 characters in body |
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Feb 17 |
comment |
Is this SSO design secure? A simple method is to find a site that has an open redirect (or set one up yourself; somesite.com/?redirectto=auth.com) and run a DNS poisoning attack of some sort to make somesite look like your site. |
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Feb 16 |
comment |
Is this SSO design secure? That's really not true - forging the referer is easy, so is forging the query string, but neither matter; because it's not that big a risk to authenticate a user against a service they have access to - just make the token site specific. |
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Feb 16 |
comment |
Is this SSO design secure? In any scenario where they're making an HTTP request, they can choose to ignore it, they can instruct users to turn it off, etc. (don't underestimate the social engineering aspect) - but just because it's hard to articulate a precise attack doesn't mean that it's hard to exploit. (Also, checking the referer and checking the query string are about as hard as each other - why not just make it work when it's turned off? The principle here is don't trust the client, build your site with that assumption and you'll automatically make it harder to attack.) |
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Feb 16 |
comment |
Is this SSO design secure? I mean add it to your query string so you're not relying on the browser to send it (in the case where a user has referers turned off, or you're requesting across domains and one is https). x-frame-options:DENY relies on the browser also doing the right thing - there's no reason an attacker can't just ignore it. |
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Feb 16 |
comment |
Could TOR nodes collect IPs and filter them to unmask .onion url IP addresses? "any other node IP addresses (publicly available)" is a bit of a misconception - it is only exit nodes that are publicly listed (because they interact with the wider WWW). |
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Feb 16 |
comment |
Create a unterminable process in Windows This StackOverflow question may help, and this Technet article - their conclusion, you can't do anything useful with something truly unkillable. Anything is must use malware-type techniques (such as installing as a driver) to become harder to kill. You may also be interested in how DRM does it. |
