| bio | website | |
|---|---|---|
| location | Brooklyn, NY | |
| age | 31 | |
| visits | member for | 2 years |
| seen | 4 hours ago | |
| stats | profile views | 275 |
Good Morning how are you, I'm dr jimbob
I'm interested in things.
I'm not a real dr,
But I am a real jim bob.
Have a PhD in Experimental High-Energy Physics, but left academia in mid-2010 to program professionally.
Mostly program/script in python, django, and jquery these days doing mostly web apps.
Also have experience programming in C, C++, java, haskell, php, and (bash) shell more in the past.
Linux as primary OS since 1999, ubuntu user since 2005 (Hoary).
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Jan 3 |
comment |
Making passwd/shadow files more secure Your best first bet is to restrict physical access -- anyone with physical access can easily put in hardware keyloggers for example even when the drive is encrypted -- wait for you to use it and then replay your keystrokes. Also, for the BIOS solution; you don't want a BIOS password (stored on the motherboard; easily worked around e.g., move to another machine) but hard disk password: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parallel_ATA#HDD_passwords_and_security . Note, a determined adversary can work around this (unlike disk encryption), but this will keep out the casual attacker. |
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Jan 2 |
comment |
Perl script rootkit (exploit) @OlierSaari - Boot off of a live cd (that you know to be safe) mount the hard disk to /mnt/unsafe_harddrive/ and try running md5sum on the executables of various utilities (e.g., md5sum /mnt/unsafe_harddrive/usr/sbin/sshd) and compare the values to the original values from the operating system (and also check that the version is the same). E.g., ubuntu 11.10 (oneric) has OpenSSH_5.8p1 Debian-7ubuntu1 with a md5sum of 6ea7510e7be723b31af0d586815b6a76 /usr/sbin/sshd. A program like tripwire can do these rootkit checks automatically. Also don't trust md5sum on your corrupted system. |
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Jan 2 |
comment |
Perl script rootkit (exploit) @OlierSaari - Have you reinstalled your OS? I doubt it was a flaw in OpenSSH that let them initially break into your systems. One of the first things they did once they did get into your system is install a rootkit that replaces safe utilities like OpenSSH's sshd with a compromised version, e.g., that always accepts a malicious key (e.g., compiled into the binary). This compromised version is based on OpenSSH (so it won't seem to be acting differently); so when you switch ports sshd_config the port does change (and apparently their scripts aren't scanning for other ports). |
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Dec 29 |
answered | Chrome vs Explorer - how to explain in plain words that open-source is better? |
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Dec 29 |
answered | Perl script rootkit (exploit) |
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Dec 29 |
answered | Reusing Private/Public Keys |
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Dec 20 |
comment |
Are passwordless SSH logins more secure? @Piskvor - If you force the idiots who use "PassWord123" to use ssh keys; they'll find a way to be insecure. E.g., why do I need a passphrase on my ssh key -- that's inconvenient (or have a trivial phrase like "this is fun") and then leave the key on multi root-user systems or back up their ssh key in public locations (gmail/dropbox/etc.). At least at the moment, I haven't run into these idiots needing root privileges on my systems. |
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Dec 20 |
comment |
Are passwordless SSH logins more secure? @Piskvor - I agree a reasonable password on the weaker side (say four word diceware or 8 random lowercase letters) ~2^36 is much smaller space than typical private key space ~2^1000. However, if fail2ban limits bad attempts to ~100/hr per IP address, your password would survive for ~4 billion years from one IP address (or would require ~40 million IP addresses to attack for a 100 years without you noticing). Therefore, they are in practice roughly equally safe as your risk in practice is not being brute-forced, but another route (physical access to your machine; installing malware; etc.). |
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Dec 20 |
answered | rsa certificate authorities |
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Dec 20 |
revised |
Are passwordless SSH logins more secure? deleted 70 characters in body |
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Dec 20 |
answered | Are passwordless SSH logins more secure? |
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Dec 15 |
comment |
JavaScript written only with brackets? It's worth pointing out that this is only a XSS vulnerability if your site executes javascript code that could be provided by untrusted users and your only safeguard is blacklisting certain keywords (which is the wrong solution). You should always use a whitelist policy/safer markup language that prevents users from executing javascript code (e.g., in comments they can't insert <script> tags, add onclick/onhover-type methods to html tags, or use eval on user provided input in your js, etc.). Then this just is obsfuscation. |
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Dec 14 |
comment |
What happens if two parties have a same pair of public&private keys @Henri - Agree; it was a mistake and I feel silly for not catching it when I saw the other mistake. But it really is insignificant. By the prime number theorem there are asymptotically x/(ln x) primes smaller than x, so there are roughly 2^503 prime numbers between 2^510 and 2^512. This would make it roughly 1/10^303. So if every atom in the observable universe (10^80 atoms) generated a trillion (10^12) keypairs every second since the big bang (4x10^17 sec), you'd only have generated ~10^110 pairs and a collision is still very unlikely. |
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Dec 14 |
revised |
What happens if two parties have a same pair of public&private keys Fixed typo; 2^-1024 ~ 1/10^308 ; not 1/10^24 (had to add more letters for edit 6 char limit). |
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Dec 14 |
suggested | suggested edit on What happens if two parties have a same pair of public&private keys |
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Dec 14 |
comment |
What happens if two parties have a same pair of public&private keys There's a typo above. (I've edited it; but don't have edit privileges). 2^-1024 ~ 10^-308.3 not about 10^-24. (Remember (b^x)^y = b^(x*y); and since 2^3.32 ~ 10, we have 2^-1024 ~ 2^(3.32*-308.3) = (2^3.32)^-308.3 ~ 10^-308.3; or just 1024*log(2)/log(10) ~ 308.3 |
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Dec 13 |
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Is using a flash drive as a base for security a safe thing to do? @Ramhound - I read your full comment; and was commenting on the part where you suggested a bad practice that would somehow solve issues. I wasn't commenting on your security card+pin solution that was reasonable (though unlikely to happen in cash-strapped public schools with administrators who put computer security as a low priority). I also agree, that its generally best for people who aren't experts in security to write their own security routines. Its very easy to inadvertently leave yourself vulnerable to major attacks. |
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Dec 13 |
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Is using a flash drive as a base for security a safe thing to do? Ramhound: avoid frequent forced password changes, it weakens security. Can't exclude users for making too many bad attempts (normal users will forget their ever-changing password). Users will develop bad practices (incremented date in their password; written on post-it on desk), and easier to socially engineer a password reset. Jan2011PW! is low entropy (~30bits) assuming month/year in there, so a modern GPU could crack in under a second (~10^9 SHA1/s). And once you find out Jan2011PW! was the password in January, you've found future passwords with very little guesswork. |
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Dec 12 |
answered | Is using a flash drive as a base for security a safe thing to do? |
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Dec 12 |
comment |
Is using a flash drive as a base for security a safe thing to do? @Ramhound - Are you serious? We've gotten over the point of every N-day password changes. It doesn't make you safer; it makes the user forgetting the password much more likely, using the simplest password that satisfies the criteria (e.g., Jan2011PW!, Mar2011PW!, etc.) or simply writing down the password nearby. |