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visits member for 3 years, 2 months
seen Mar 16 at 0:43

Nov
1
awarded  Yearling
Jan
26
answered What are the best reasons you've heard for not implementing security?
Jan
26
accepted Enforce Code/Script Signing
Jan
22
asked Enforce Code/Script Signing
Nov
4
awarded  Citizen Patrol
Oct
3
revised Keeping secrets from root on Linux
edited body
Oct
3
comment Keeping secrets from root on Linux
Thought that could probably be the case. Still, it was worth mentioning, on the off chance it might spin off a similar idea that could help. And it seems to have helped others! :)
Oct
3
awarded  Teacher
Oct
3
answered Keeping secrets from root on Linux
Oct
3
comment Limiting the root certificate chain
This isn't exactly ideal, but it does go some way towards fixing the problem, so long as it's available in every browser. I don't believe this is the case for anything in the Windows trust store (Chrome, IE for example), though could be wrong. Ideally I'd like these constraints to be specified in the root certificate itself though (in such a way that any certificates issued beyond those constraints are automatically invalid).
Oct
1
asked Limiting the root certificate chain
Aug
13
comment Geographic equivilent of RFC 3161 (X.509 PKI Time-stamp Protocol)
Sorry about the question vagueness. I'm meaning for, say, a mobile device to attain a 'geostamping signature' of sorts cryptographically proving that the device was at "lat x long y" coordinates at a specific time when it sent some message m to a central server, similar to how you can currently prove that m existed in a certain state at time T by hashing it and sending the hash to a timestamping service. We can assume that the device itself isn't trustworthy, but the infrastructure is (likely, they'll be doing the signing). I can see how that was badly worded though, I'm sorry!
Aug
13
awarded  Editor
Aug
13
revised Geographic equivilent of RFC 3161 (X.509 PKI Time-stamp Protocol)
Added clarification
Aug
13
awarded  Supporter
Aug
13
awarded  Scholar
Aug
13
accepted Geographic equivilent of RFC 3161 (X.509 PKI Time-stamp Protocol)
Aug
13
comment Geographic equivilent of RFC 3161 (X.509 PKI Time-stamp Protocol)
It wasn't so much the authenticity of the GPS signal, more the authenticity of the geographic location of a specific device, for example, making sure a user with, say, a mobile app couldn't simply send false data to a server about their current location. Researching Galileo now though, looks very interesting! Sadly, I'm not sure this will be available anywhere aside from Europe (I myself live in New Zealand)...
Aug
13
comment Geographic equivilent of RFC 3161 (X.509 PKI Time-stamp Protocol)
Sorry it took so long to get around to reading this! Definitely given me a far greater insight into the problem, and certainly not something I'm going to be able to solve for the ideas I had in mind. The alternate method you specified is probably closest to what I had in mind as a possible solution, but again, clearly infeasible unless in a rather localized area. It has been an extremely interesting read though, something I might muse over for a few days yet! Thank you for such a comprehensive and through response!
Aug
7
awarded  Student