network profile
| bio | website | |
|---|---|---|
| location | ||
| age | ||
| visits | member for | 1 year, 10 months |
| seen | Jul 15 '12 at 7:50 | |
| stats | profile views | 11 |
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Jan 26 |
answered | What are the best reasons you've heard for not implementing security? |
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Jan 26 |
accepted | Enforce Code/Script Signing |
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Jan 22 |
asked | Enforce Code/Script Signing |
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Nov 4 |
awarded | Citizen Patrol |
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Oct 3 |
revised |
Keeping secrets from root on Linux edited body |
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Oct 3 |
comment |
Keeping secrets from root on Linux Thought that could probably be the case. Still, it was worth mentioning, on the off chance it might spin off a similar idea that could help. And it seems to have helped others! :) |
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Oct 3 |
awarded | Teacher |
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Oct 3 |
answered | Keeping secrets from root on Linux |
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Oct 3 |
comment |
Limiting the root certificate chain This isn't exactly ideal, but it does go some way towards fixing the problem, so long as it's available in every browser. I don't believe this is the case for anything in the Windows trust store (Chrome, IE for example), though could be wrong. Ideally I'd like these constraints to be specified in the root certificate itself though (in such a way that any certificates issued beyond those constraints are automatically invalid). |
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Oct 1 |
asked | Limiting the root certificate chain |
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Aug 13 |
comment |
Geographic equivilent of RFC 3161 (X.509 PKI Time-stamp Protocol) Sorry about the question vagueness. I'm meaning for, say, a mobile device to attain a 'geostamping signature' of sorts cryptographically proving that the device was at "lat x long y" coordinates at a specific time when it sent some message m to a central server, similar to how you can currently prove that m existed in a certain state at time T by hashing it and sending the hash to a timestamping service. We can assume that the device itself isn't trustworthy, but the infrastructure is (likely, they'll be doing the signing). I can see how that was badly worded though, I'm sorry! |
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Aug 13 |
awarded | Editor |
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Aug 13 |
revised |
Geographic equivilent of RFC 3161 (X.509 PKI Time-stamp Protocol) Added clarification |
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Aug 13 |
awarded | Supporter |
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Aug 13 |
awarded | Scholar |
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Aug 13 |
accepted | Geographic equivilent of RFC 3161 (X.509 PKI Time-stamp Protocol) |
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Aug 13 |
comment |
Geographic equivilent of RFC 3161 (X.509 PKI Time-stamp Protocol) It wasn't so much the authenticity of the GPS signal, more the authenticity of the geographic location of a specific device, for example, making sure a user with, say, a mobile app couldn't simply send false data to a server about their current location. Researching Galileo now though, looks very interesting! Sadly, I'm not sure this will be available anywhere aside from Europe (I myself live in New Zealand)... |
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Aug 13 |
comment |
Geographic equivilent of RFC 3161 (X.509 PKI Time-stamp Protocol) Sorry it took so long to get around to reading this! Definitely given me a far greater insight into the problem, and certainly not something I'm going to be able to solve for the ideas I had in mind. The alternate method you specified is probably closest to what I had in mind as a possible solution, but again, clearly infeasible unless in a rather localized area. It has been an extremely interesting read though, something I might muse over for a few days yet! Thank you for such a comprehensive and through response! |
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Aug 7 |
awarded | Student |
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Aug 7 |
asked | Geographic equivilent of RFC 3161 (X.509 PKI Time-stamp Protocol) |
