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| bio | website | cfcausa.org |
|---|---|---|
| location | Kansas City | |
| age | 29 | |
| visits | member for | 1 year, 8 months |
| seen | 4 hours ago | |
| stats | profile views | 11 |
Systems Security Engineer for CFCA, a non profit organization.
Want to help someone living in poverty? Check us out at www.cfcausa.org.
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May 12 |
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User Account Control and outside processes @WChargin - correct |
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May 6 |
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What does having an internal two-tier PKI protect against? @MDMarra - even an online responder needs a source for the OCSP data. Once compromised you can't expect the online ca to provide it. Unless I'm mistaken that also needs to come from the offline CA being higher up the hierarchy. |
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Mar 22 |
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How would you detect whether customer data has been leaked? @D.W. - I saw a three year term for one of the vendors I looked at. Thought about actually marketing doing this as a support feature with a 1, 2, or 3 year term. |
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Mar 6 |
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Normalizing Windows Advanced Firewall rules The rules are based on security groups in Active Directory, not subnets. There isn't a way for a given IP (windows and joined to our domain or otherwise) to get access without successful authentication (by being a member of the approved group in AD). |
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Mar 5 |
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Normalizing Windows Advanced Firewall rules Once segmented only Windows systems would be part of the cardholder environment. By using Windows Advanced Firewall + IPSEC it isn't possible for non authenticated systems (my Linux and OSX boxes included) to access the cardholder environment. |
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Feb 22 |
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Preventing artificial latency or “Lag Hacking” in multiplayer games Wow.. The topology you're describing is a whole lot like how Netflix handles its streaming video deployment. Would never have thought about using it as an anti cheating mechanism. Basically the same premise just with CPU power instead of disk space. I've been wondering about the same issues Root outlined for years. Very well stated. |
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Dec 7 |
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IIS 6.0 - mitigating BEAST @Thomas - I'd love to see an example of turning off these ciphers. We're getting failed on our audit for the same reason. It's an old Exchange 2003 box and we're getting failed for our SSL encrypted SMTP rules. |
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Nov 14 |
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Attack vectors opened simultaneous wireless and wired networks Thanks D.W. - that is what I was thinking but I wasn't familiar enough to be sure. |
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Nov 14 |
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Attack vectors opened simultaneous wireless and wired networks Helpful, thanks. What I'm looking for is some help with the analysis of what kind of threats are created specifically from having both connections active at the same time. I'll revise my question body to reflect this. Any assumptions it looks like I've made are accurate to my situation. |
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Nov 14 |
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Attack vectors opened simultaneous wireless and wired networks Thanks. The networks in question would make be totally independent other than the laptops |
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Nov 14 |
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Attack vectors opened simultaneous wireless and wired networks @asudhak - there are zero days which can run arbitrary code, including reverse connections to open consoles. From there the routing commands would be easy. |
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Oct 23 |
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What are the security or privacy issues with allowing users to forward email from our Google Apps account to their personal Gmail? Wasn't the answer you received on serverfault an hour ago good enough? serverfault.com/questions/441449/… |
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Sep 1 |
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IPSec Domain Isolation with Windows Server @Nock- request mode is ipec being optional, allowing unencrypted connections. The second paragraph is attempting to describe the different modes. |
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Aug 20 |
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Password Vault - Enterprise @Tim - no stability or reliability problems whatsoever. |
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Aug 20 |
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Password Vault - Enterprise @Tim - We've been using for a couple years individually, I'd say a year to 18 months for the second paragraph, a few months for the third paragraph. |
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Feb 22 |
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The point of PCI 1.3.1 through 1.3.3 I get that, thanks. What I don't understand here is why the traffic is supposed to pass through a DMZ before entering the internal network when the function that the DMZ is supposed to provide is already done within the firewall proper. |
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Feb 21 |
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The point of PCI 1.3.1 through 1.3.3 I realize it. :) Still need to abide by the rules though. Trying to see if I did miss something. |
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Jan 25 |
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What logs to retain for PCI-DSS? How long to retain the logs isn't an issue. We have tools in place to address that need. My issue is how much to keep on a daily basis, specifically the above points. Why would I have a separate log server on top of Splunk? That is my central log server. Anything not kept on an external log server is suspect so the original files are basically useless. |
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Nov 18 |
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Does a Virtual Machine stop malware from doing harm? The only things that I've seen have been in regards to the VMware tools. Thanks for bringing up the cloudburst stuff. I'll update accordingly. |
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Nov 18 |
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Does a Virtual Machine stop malware from doing harm? Good point. I generally don't install VMware tools unless I have a defined need. |
