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| bio | website | |
|---|---|---|
| location | ||
| age | 67 | |
| visits | member for | 1 year, 8 months |
| seen | May 17 at 17:36 | |
| stats | profile views | 1,215 |
I SHALL DEVOUR YOUR HEART AND FEAST ON YOUR SOUL (so don't bug me).
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Mar 2 |
awarded | encryption |
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Mar 1 |
answered | Tracing root compromises |
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Mar 1 |
comment |
Safely generate a non-log file within an application server Conspiracy implies secrecy, not mere discretion. |
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Mar 1 |
answered | To DMZ, or not to DMZ |
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Mar 1 |
comment |
What elliptic curves are supported by browsers? Such a list would be useful, but would have to be maintained. The situation is made more complex because the OS version may matter; I suspect IE 8.0 could support ECC if used on a recent enough OS, e.g. Windows 7. Also, processing of X.509 certificates and usage of elliptic curves as part of an ECHDE cipher suite are usually distinct software elements, which need not support the exact same set of curves. |
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Mar 1 |
answered | Safely generate a non-log file within an application server |
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Mar 1 |
answered | How to have Thunderbird include a root certificate? |
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Mar 1 |
answered | Java SecureRandom generate secure random number |
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Mar 1 |
answered | What elliptic curves are supported by browsers? |
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Mar 1 |
answered | Does DSA need padding? |
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Feb 28 |
answered | Why so long to break 128-bit encryption? |
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Feb 28 |
answered | What key sizes are allowed within TLS if the DHE_RSA is the only key exchange allowed? |
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Feb 28 |
comment |
How less secure is an encryption if we know something about the original data? The HMAC used internally in PBKDF2 is indeed totally unrelated to a MAC computed over the encrypted data. HMAC just happens to be a convenient cryptographic element for building algorithms (i.e. HMAC is a reasonably good emulation of a "random oracle"). |
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Feb 28 |
comment |
How less secure is an encryption if we know something about the original data? People use CBC out of tradition; better modes are newer and not as widespread in cryptographic libraries. Active attacks on data files or streams which do not have proper integrity checks are a reality. |
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Feb 28 |
comment |
How less secure is an encryption if we know something about the original data? Active attacks suppose that the attacker can modify data and then observe what happens when one of the target systems processes that data. When the attacker just gets a read-only peek at the data and then has to work alone on his own machines, then that's a context where only passive attacks are possible -- it just happens that such contexts are rather rare. |
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Feb 28 |
answered | How less secure is an encryption if we know something about the original data? |
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Feb 27 |
answered | PKCS#7 message constructed by our code, any weaknesses in the output? |
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Feb 27 |
comment |
How does PKCS#7 padding work with AES-256, CBC mode? Application sends data. When a full block is received, the block is encrypted. At any one time, between 0 and 15 bytes are still buffered. The "finalize" function is called: between 1 and 16 bytes are appended to the buffered data (to reach the length of 16), and that final block is encrypted like all the others. If 0 bytes were buffered at that point, 16 padding bytes are appended (all of numerical value 16), and that extra block is encrypted (leading to the seemingly random bytes). |
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Feb 27 |
answered | How does PKCS#7 padding work with AES-256, CBC mode? |
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Feb 27 |
answered | Are private keys generated by different software packages compatible? |
