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I SHALL DEVOUR YOUR HEART AND FEAST ON YOUR SOUL (so don't bug me).


Mar
12
comment rainbow table for AES 256 CBC knowing IV, cipher text and plain text
If you know the plaintext, then it is a known-plaintext attack. For a chosen-plaintext attack, you must be able to choose the plaintext. For once, cryptographers managed to come up with clear terminology.
Mar
12
answered rainbow table for AES 256 CBC knowing IV, cipher text and plain text
Mar
12
answered Does the secure attention key really increase security?
Mar
9
awarded  certificate-authority
Mar
4
awarded  protocols
Feb
25
comment SSL/TLS in-memory data interception after decryption
@Pacerier: simply terminology confusion. What I call "virtual memory" is what is known as "swap space" on Linux; but on Windows things are traditionally called differently. What matters here is data that is in RAM and then gets written to disk (as opposed to data which is conceptually in RAM but is read from disk when necessary).
Feb
12
awarded  Nice Answer
Feb
11
awarded  Revival
Feb
5
awarded  rsa
Jan
29
awarded  Necromancer
Jan
13
awarded  Nice Answer
Jan
7
comment Plausibly deniable SSH - does it make sense?
Conceivably the server could decide to switch to SSH behaviour (and sending a banner) if it did not get a SSL ClientHello within, say, 5 or 10 seconds after the connection. A 5-second initial delay is usually not a serious problem for SSH (SSH connections are long-lived).
Jan
7
comment PGP as method of sharing AES key?
I would not recommend using a WoT because I don't believe that WoT actually provide any substantial guarantee. It is more a ritual dance by which WoT users try to propitiate the Crypto Gods, than a really effective method for thwarting attacks. What really works against attacks is public key pinning, by which clients remember server keys. In OpenPGP, the WoT is so cumbersome to use that clients invariably use key pinning after having appeased the WoT deity, and that provides security.
Jan
7
comment Why use 256-bit symmetric encryption in TLS when 2048-bit RSA doesn't even offer 128-bit strength?
Belief that "key entropy" acts like some kind of sci-fi shield strength that is incrementally consumed by cryptanalytic attacks, is unsubstantiated. It is a common reflex to go for longer keys as if it granted some sort of "security margin", but in fact attacks don't work that way. In the case of AES and the only known non-trivial attacks (which are related-key attacks so not an immediate worry), 256-bit keys turn out to be weaker than 128-bit keys, not stronger. The only case where longer keys are actually "stronger" is against brute force, for which 128-bit keys are already strong enough.
Dec
30
awarded  Revival
Dec
28
awarded  Enlightened
Dec
28
awarded  Nice Answer
Dec
26
awarded  Enlightened
Dec
26
awarded  Nice Answer
Dec
25
awarded  Good Answer