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I SHALL DEVOUR YOUR HEART AND FEAST ON YOUR SOUL (so don't bug me).


Feb
11
awarded  Revival
Feb
5
awarded  rsa
Jan
29
awarded  Necromancer
Jan
13
awarded  Nice Answer
Jan
7
comment Plausibly deniable SSH - does it make sense?
Conceivably the server could decide to switch to SSH behaviour (and sending a banner) if it did not get a SSL ClientHello within, say, 5 or 10 seconds after the connection. A 5-second initial delay is usually not a serious problem for SSH (SSH connections are long-lived).
Jan
7
comment PGP as method of sharing AES key?
I would not recommend using a WoT because I don't believe that WoT actually provide any substantial guarantee. It is more a ritual dance by which WoT users try to propitiate the Crypto Gods, than a really effective method for thwarting attacks. What really works against attacks is public key pinning, by which clients remember server keys. In OpenPGP, the WoT is so cumbersome to use that clients invariably use key pinning after having appeased the WoT deity, and that provides security.
Jan
7
comment Why use 256-bit symmetric encryption in TLS when 2048-bit RSA doesn't even offer 128-bit strength?
Belief that "key entropy" acts like some kind of sci-fi shield strength that is incrementally consumed by cryptanalytic attacks, is unsubstantiated. It is a common reflex to go for longer keys as if it granted some sort of "security margin", but in fact attacks don't work that way. In the case of AES and the only known non-trivial attacks (which are related-key attacks so not an immediate worry), 256-bit keys turn out to be weaker than 128-bit keys, not stronger. The only case where longer keys are actually "stronger" is against brute force, for which 128-bit keys are already strong enough.
Dec
30
awarded  Revival
Dec
28
awarded  Enlightened
Dec
28
awarded  Nice Answer
Dec
26
awarded  Enlightened
Dec
26
awarded  Nice Answer
Dec
25
awarded  Good Answer
Dec
21
comment How is user authentication sent in a public wifi? Radius/802.1x/EAP etc
Some routers intercept the first outgoing HTTP connection and replace it with the router "login page"; but the client system will not send that request unless it has first resolved the IP address of the target server, so DNS has to go through.
Dec
20
awarded  Good Answer
Dec
19
revised Does the entire AES encrypted dataset have to be present to be 'cracked'?
added 25 characters in body
Dec
19
comment Does the entire AES encrypted dataset have to be present to be 'cracked'?
If the PRNG output is in some way predictable by attackers, then the security properties achieved by the "splitting" are reduced, possibly lost completely -- at which point you still have an AES-encrypted string, which should resist until the end of times (unless the encryption key can be guessed, e.g. it was generated with the same flawed PRNG; or the library that uses AES to "encrypt a string" turns out to do something stupid, e.g. CBC with a fixed IV for all strings).
Dec
19
awarded  Enlightened
Dec
19
awarded  Nice Answer
Dec
19
answered Does the entire AES encrypted dataset have to be present to be 'cracked'?