155,071 reputation
25324526
bio website bolet.org/~pornin
location Quebec City, Canada
age 39
visits member for 4 years
seen 1 hour ago

Cryptographer, programmer in several languages (C, Java, several assemblies, Pascal, Forth...). I also have a life.


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awarded  Nice Answer
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18
awarded  Good Answer
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18
comment Why do we not trust an SSL certificate that expired recently?
Some CA can include expired certificates in CRL, subject to a cut-off date that is later than the certificate expiry date (and possibly infinitely remote in the future), but that's CA specific, and verifiers cannot count on it unless it is documented as an appropriate CRL extension. There is no standard extension for that (there is a Microsoft-specific one, though). Adjustable cut-off is a nice idea, but this is still an expiry date (expiry on the revocation information, not on the certificate itself), and cannot be reliably used until it becomes widely supported (and right now it is not).
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awarded  Nice Answer
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awarded  Guru
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17
answered Why not use symmetric encryption?
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17
awarded  server
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awarded  tls
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awarded  tls
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awarded  tls
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answered Ubuntu/Debian Is it okay to use a sudouser account as my primary on a workstation?
Dec
16
comment Is it possible to upgrade the SSL version of a connection from the server's side only?
You would have to alter the code on the server, in the SSL library, at the point where it selects the protocol version based on what the client sends. The modification should be minimal, but of course you have to be able to alter the server code. It also sends you in the uncharted area of "custom protocols" so everything afterwards becomes your fault.
Dec
16
answered Is it possible to upgrade the SSL version of a connection from the server's side only?
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15
awarded  Nice Answer
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13
answered Is it more secure to overwrite the value char[] in a String
Dec
12
comment Is a rand from /dev/urandom secure for a login key?
There is no contradiction (also, Schneier is merely quoting an article written by other people). The research paper worries about recovering from an internal state compromise, an already rotten situation. If your system was utterly compromised, you should have nuked it from orbit, rather than keeping on generating keys with it; what the article says is that if you do the wrong thing (keep on using the compromised machine "as is" and pray for the best) then the PRNG used in /dev/random (and urandom) won't save your skin -- but, realistically, nothing would have.
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awarded  Nice Answer
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10
awarded  Yearling
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10
awarded  attack-prevention
Dec
10
comment What key exchange mechanism should be used in TLS?
Yes. Now fixed. In fact DSA means Digital Signature Algorithm, and is specified in the Digital Signature Standard (FIPS 186). For some unknown reason, the SSL 3.0 standard uses the "DSS" acronym instead of "DSA", and this use has been perpetuated in more recent versions of TLS; but when ECDSA came into the picture, the chosen acronym was ECDSA, not ECDSS. Further confusion comes from RSA, where the "SA" does not mean "signature algorithm" (as it does in "DSA") but "Shamir and Adleman" (two of the three inventors of RSA).