| bio | website | |
|---|---|---|
| location | ||
| age | ||
| visits | member for | 1 year, 4 months |
| seen | Feb 5 at 9:37 | |
| stats | profile views | 12 |
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Oct 10 |
accepted | Dirty and clean interface on DMZ gateways |
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Oct 8 |
comment |
Dirty and clean interface on DMZ gateways Thanks. But why do I need two different network interfaces for a two-tiered scenario? I could imagine a scenario with only one internal IP on the gateway and a NAT rule on the external firewall which forwards requests originally targeting the external public IP address to the internal IP address on the gateway... And obviously, the internal IP address is known by clients from the intranet. |
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Oct 8 |
asked | Dirty and clean interface on DMZ gateways |
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Apr 16 |
answered | Security of Cloud Storage |
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Mar 6 |
awarded | Teacher |
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Mar 3 |
comment |
Proof of SIM card possession on iOS devices Well, even on a jailbroken device an SMS is only delivered to the device if it's in the possession of the correct SIM card. So receiving an SMS that contains a challenge works also on jailbroken iOS devices... As it's not possible to react automatically to an incoming SMS the user has to read the challenge and has to enter it in the corresponding app. It's definitely not user-friendly, but quite secure... |
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Feb 28 |
answered | Best practice to encrypt data in an Android application |
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Feb 28 |
comment |
Best practice to encrypt data in an Android application Why is setting up an ssl connection not an option? If you are writing the app, I assume that you are in control of both the app and the server. That would be the easiest option in order to decrypt the transmitted data. You wouldn't even have to store the public key of the server in your code as it is part of the handshake. In Android, SSL is really easy to implement as pure java code can be used. By the way, using SSL the integrity issue is also solved. |
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Feb 19 |
comment |
Proof of SIM card possession on iOS devices You're right, this would be a way. But I'd prefer a programmatic solution if somehow possible. |
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Feb 19 |
asked | Proof of SIM card possession on iOS devices |
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Feb 19 |
asked | Can malware read keychain entries on iOS devices? |
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Feb 19 |
comment |
SMS / voice call interception with a fake base station By the way, according to the defcon video intercepting SMS and voice calls is only easily possible on GSM. So if you can, choose 3G or higher and you should be safe. |
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Feb 19 |
awarded | Scholar |
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Feb 19 |
comment |
SMS / voice call interception with a fake base station The defcon demonstration videos are quite useful! In video 4/4 it's clearly said that outbound calls are much easier to catch than inbound calls. The Secret Key of the SIM card has to be cracked in order to authenticate the fake base station to the carrier's network. That is neccessary if you want to intercept inbound calls. At the time of the video (2010), only professional IMSI catcher are able to handle this. I assume that this is the same for incoming SMS. |
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Feb 19 |
accepted | SMS / voice call interception with a fake base station |
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Feb 16 |
awarded | Supporter |
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Feb 16 |
asked | SMS / voice call interception with a fake base station |
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Feb 14 |
comment |
iOS: Sandbox on jailbroken device But I guess it's also a function of the sandbox to protect application's data from beeing accessed by malicious applications (i.e. trojans). This protections doesn't work anymore on jailbroken devices, isn't it? |
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Feb 14 |
awarded | Student |
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Feb 13 |
asked | iOS: Sandbox on jailbroken device |