Timeline for iOS Encryption Details
Current License: CC BY-SA 3.0
10 events
| when toggle format | what | by | license | comment | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Aug 2, 2013 at 6:50 | comment | added | Thomas | Are the files then encrypted only when the device is off or locked? | |
| Jun 15, 2011 at 15:41 | history | edited | user185 | CC BY-SA 3.0 |
passcode locks
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| Jun 9, 2011 at 19:03 | comment | added | user185 | @frankodwyer a valid point, but remember that this basically gives you "how much do I care about my personal data?" If you require a password in your app, then the user can still choose a poor password if they don't care much. | |
| Apr 20, 2011 at 20:06 | comment | added | frankodwyer | Graham, I think it is worth mentioning that NSFileProtectionComplete & co are only really effective when data protection is enabled and the device has a PIN or passphrase set (in other words the key involved is derived from a user known secret not stored on the device - hence why the data is not available when the device is locked). | |
| Mar 13, 2011 at 15:43 | comment | added | user185 | @Paul: A good reference for the iOS filesystem setup is "iPhone Forensics" from O'Reilly: oreilly.com/catalog/9780596153595 The encryption info can be found in Apple's technical papers and developer documentation. | |
| Mar 13, 2011 at 15:10 | comment | added | Phoenician-Eagle | @Graham, do you have a reference for your description. I am very much interested in this with more details. Particularly of what I am still not getting: -will the key for decrypting be compromised? If I use for iOS4 apps this same encryption API but do encrypt the confidential data on my own, will that be also not sufficient? Many thanks | |
| Dec 12, 2010 at 17:58 | comment | added | user185 | @Rory: yes. So jail broken phones can still access the data (and a quick scp -rp root@iPhone:/* . lets you get all of it in that case). | |
| Dec 12, 2010 at 15:06 | comment | added | Rory McCune | Ahh I see, thanks for that. So essentially attacks where a custom OS is loaded onto the device (like using limera1n), will bypass the first class of protection as by the time they're inserted into the boot process the partition is unlocked, but physical attacks on the flash memory would fail (unless the key could be retrieved in some way) | |
| Dec 12, 2010 at 15:06 | vote | accept | Rory McCune | ||
| Dec 12, 2010 at 14:08 | history | answered | user185 | CC BY-SA 2.5 |