4 added 131 characters in body
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The HSTS header stops MitM attacks by instructing the browser to always send HTTPS (as opposed to HTTP) request to the domain until the policy expires. So a browser that respects the header would send a request to https://example.com even if the user clicked a link to http://example.com.

The logic behind HSTS has not changed since it was defined in an RFC in 2012. What has changed is that today almost all browsers implement it. Remember that it is the browser that enforce this policy! Can I Use reports browsers supporting it from the following versions:

  • Internet Explorer 11 (2015)
  • Firefox 4 (2011)
  • Chrome 3 (2010, possibly also supported earlier)
  • Safari 7 (2013)

(How Firefox and Chrome managed to support HSTS before the RFC was out is a mystery to me.)

So people using browsers older than that will not be protected even if the header is set. (How Firefox and Chrome managed to support it beforeThat might account for why you have the RFC was out is a mysteryimpression that setting the HSTS header did not use to mehelp against SSLStrip earlier.)

Another reason for HSTS not helping can be that the user has never visit the page before the attack. If the browser has never seen the header it can not enforce it. This can be solved with preloading.

The HSTS header stops MitM attacks by instructing the browser to always send HTTPS (as opposed to HTTP) request to the domain until the policy expires. So a browser that respects the header would send a request to https://example.com even if the user clicked a link to http://example.com.

The logic behind HSTS has not changed since it was defined in an RFC in 2012. What has changed is that today almost all browsers implement it. Remember that it is the browser that enforce this policy! Can I Use reports browsers supporting it from the following versions:

  • Internet Explorer 11 (2015)
  • Firefox 4 (2011)
  • Chrome 3 (2010, possibly also supported earlier)
  • Safari 7 (2013)

So people using browsers older than that will not be protected even if the header is set. (How Firefox and Chrome managed to support it before the RFC was out is a mystery to me.)

Another reason for HSTS not helping can be that the user has never visit the page before the attack. If the browser has never seen the header it can not enforce it. This can be solved with preloading.

The HSTS header stops MitM attacks by instructing the browser to always send HTTPS (as opposed to HTTP) request to the domain until the policy expires. So a browser that respects the header would send a request to https://example.com even if the user clicked a link to http://example.com.

The logic behind HSTS has not changed since it was defined in an RFC in 2012. What has changed is that today almost all browsers implement it. Remember that it is the browser that enforce this policy! Can I Use reports browsers supporting it from the following versions:

  • Internet Explorer 11 (2015)
  • Firefox 4 (2011)
  • Chrome 3 (2010, possibly also supported earlier)
  • Safari 7 (2013)

(How Firefox and Chrome managed to support HSTS before the RFC was out is a mystery to me.)

So people using browsers older than that will not be protected even if the header is set. That might account for why you have the impression that setting the HSTS header did not use to help against SSLStrip earlier.

Another reason for HSTS not helping can be that the user has never visit the page before the attack. If the browser has never seen the header it can not enforce it. This can be solved with preloading.

3 deleted 8 characters in body
source | link

The HSTS header stops MitM attacks by instructing the browser to always send HTTPS (as opposed to HTTP) request to the domain until the policy expires. So a browser that respects the header would send a request to https://example.com even if the user clicked a link to http://example.com.

The logic behind HSTS has not changed since it was defined in an RFC in 2012. However whatWhat has changed is that today almost all browsers implement it. Remember that it is the browser that enforce this policy! Can I Use reports browsers supporting it from the following versions:

  • Internet Explorer 11 (2015)
  • Firefox 4 (2011)
  • Chrome 3 (2010, possibly also supported earlier)
  • Safari 7 (2013)

So people using browsers older than that will not be protected even if the header is set. (How Firefox and Chrome managed to support it before the RFC was out is a mystery to me.)

Another reason for HSTS not helping can be that the user has never visit the page before the attack. If the browser has never seen the header it can not enforce it. This can be solved with preloading.

The HSTS header stops MitM attacks by instructing the browser to always send HTTPS (as opposed to HTTP) request to the domain until the policy expires. So a browser that respects the header would send a request to https://example.com even if the user clicked a link to http://example.com.

The logic behind HSTS has not changed since it was defined in an RFC in 2012. However what has changed is that today almost all browsers implement it. Remember that it is the browser that enforce this policy! Can I Use reports browsers supporting it from the following versions:

  • Internet Explorer 11 (2015)
  • Firefox 4 (2011)
  • Chrome 3 (2010, possibly also supported earlier)
  • Safari 7 (2013)

So people using browsers older than that will not be protected even if the header is set. (How Firefox and Chrome managed to support it before the RFC was out is a mystery to me.)

Another reason for HSTS not helping can be that the user has never visit the page before the attack. If the browser has never seen the header it can not enforce it. This can be solved with preloading.

The HSTS header stops MitM attacks by instructing the browser to always send HTTPS (as opposed to HTTP) request to the domain until the policy expires. So a browser that respects the header would send a request to https://example.com even if the user clicked a link to http://example.com.

The logic behind HSTS has not changed since it was defined in an RFC in 2012. What has changed is that today almost all browsers implement it. Remember that it is the browser that enforce this policy! Can I Use reports browsers supporting it from the following versions:

  • Internet Explorer 11 (2015)
  • Firefox 4 (2011)
  • Chrome 3 (2010, possibly also supported earlier)
  • Safari 7 (2013)

So people using browsers older than that will not be protected even if the header is set. (How Firefox and Chrome managed to support it before the RFC was out is a mystery to me.)

Another reason for HSTS not helping can be that the user has never visit the page before the attack. If the browser has never seen the header it can not enforce it. This can be solved with preloading.

2 added 496 characters in body
source | link

The HSTS header stops MitM attacks by instructing the browser to always send HTTPS (as opposed to HTTP) request to the domain until the policy expires. So a browser that respects the header would send a request to https://example.com even if the user clicked a link to http://example.com.

The logic behind HSTS has not changed since it was defined in an RFCRFC in 2012. However what has changed is that today virtuallyalmost all browsers implement it. Remember that it is the browser that enforce this policy! Can I Use reports browsers supporting it from the following versions:

  • Internet Explorer 11 (2015)
  • Firefox 4 (2011)
  • Chrome 3 (2010, possibly also supported earlier)
  • Safari 7 (2013)

So people using browsers older than that will not be protected even if the header is set. (How Firefox and Chrome managed to support it before the RFC was out is a mystery to me.)

Another reason for HSTS not helping can be that the user has never visit the page before the attack. If the browser has never seen the header it can not enforce it. This can be solved with preloading.

The HSTS header stops MitM attacks by instructing the browser to always send HTTPS (as opposed to HTTP) request to the domain until the policy expires. So a browser that respects the header would send a request to https://example.com even if the user clicked a link to http://example.com.

The logic behind HSTS has not changed since it was defined in an RFC. However what has changed is that today virtually all browsers implement it. Remember that it is the browser that enforce this policy! Can I Use reports browsers supporting it from the following versions:

  • Internet Explorer 11 (2015)
  • Firefox 4 (2011)
  • Chrome 3 (2010, possibly also supported earlier)
  • Safari 7 (2013)

The HSTS header stops MitM attacks by instructing the browser to always send HTTPS (as opposed to HTTP) request to the domain until the policy expires. So a browser that respects the header would send a request to https://example.com even if the user clicked a link to http://example.com.

The logic behind HSTS has not changed since it was defined in an RFC in 2012. However what has changed is that today almost all browsers implement it. Remember that it is the browser that enforce this policy! Can I Use reports browsers supporting it from the following versions:

  • Internet Explorer 11 (2015)
  • Firefox 4 (2011)
  • Chrome 3 (2010, possibly also supported earlier)
  • Safari 7 (2013)

So people using browsers older than that will not be protected even if the header is set. (How Firefox and Chrome managed to support it before the RFC was out is a mystery to me.)

Another reason for HSTS not helping can be that the user has never visit the page before the attack. If the browser has never seen the header it can not enforce it. This can be solved with preloading.

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source | link