Timeline for Can ROM checksum checker reliably defend against non-physical tampering/hacking of a voting machine?
Current License: CC BY-SA 3.0
9 events
| when toggle format | what | by | license | comment | |
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| Nov 26, 2016 at 0:29 | answer | added | Out of Band | timeline score: 0 | |
| Nov 25, 2016 at 23:10 | history | edited | DVK | CC BY-SA 3.0 |
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| Nov 25, 2016 at 22:23 | history | edited | DVK | CC BY-SA 3.0 |
added 475 characters in body
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| Nov 25, 2016 at 21:08 | answer | added | Out of Band | timeline score: 1 | |
| Nov 25, 2016 at 18:31 | comment | added | crovers | The other issue is this sort of thing is very difficult - look at the difficulties with TPM that Intel has had - a good summary is at blog.invisiblethings.org/papers/2015/x86_harmful.pdf - proving correctness of all running components is HARD | |
| Nov 25, 2016 at 17:56 | answer | added | John Deters | timeline score: 1 | |
| Nov 25, 2016 at 17:53 | comment | added | Xiong Chiamiov | Personally I think end-to-end auditable systems are a better path to invest in, as they provide wider guarantees of non-tampering. | |
| Nov 25, 2016 at 17:10 | review | First posts | |||
| Nov 25, 2016 at 18:02 | |||||
| Nov 25, 2016 at 17:08 | history | asked | DVK | CC BY-SA 3.0 |