Timeline for Intel SGX and enclaves - how secured is it?
Current License: CC BY-SA 3.0
8 events
when toggle format | what | by | license | comment | |
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Nov 19, 2017 at 4:03 | review | Suggested edits | |||
Nov 19, 2017 at 8:08 | |||||
Nov 19, 2017 at 4:00 | comment | added | guest | The enclave is designed for you to run sensitive operations in it. It is up to you to decide what operations are sensitive enough to be secured with SGX. It provides a minimum way to communicate outside the enclave, so you have to write an API to do that (or use an existing library). Deciding what the API can do and what information goes over it is not in the scope of the SGX design. | |
Feb 16, 2017 at 16:38 | vote | accept | ArielB | ||
Nov 30, 2016 at 11:43 | comment | added | KOLANICH | If you want to use SGX as a DRM you should do everything you can in an enclave. But don't be surprized if noone buys your app. | |
Nov 30, 2016 at 11:41 | comment | added | KOLANICH | Here is a nice must-read overview of sgx: eprint.iacr.org/2016/086.pdf | |
Nov 30, 2016 at 11:13 | comment | added | ArielB | what i'm trying to emphasize - will i have to perform all the logic that relates to my encrypted data inside the enclave? because if i return any decrypted content to the untrusted domain - it's like i havent done anything. right? | |
Nov 30, 2016 at 11:12 | comment | added | ArielB | Can you explain more about the attestation? Enclave is just a piece of code that performs what i want it to do. so the process is to supply the "secret" data after i seal it? if so, isn't an untrusted domain is responsible on doing it? (which means, an attacker can feed it?) about the 2nd question, my main idea is to decrypt information sent from a server to a lets say desktop computer. i need to save the decryption key somewhere - so in theory my app will send the encrypted data to the enclave, and it will decrypt it. why won't an attacker do the same? | |
Nov 30, 2016 at 11:05 | history | answered | KOLANICH | CC BY-SA 3.0 |